

Selected Documents of the Khmer Rouge

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The National Anthem of Democratic Kampuchea

The red, red blood splatters the cities and plains
of the Cambodian fatherland,
The sublime blood of the workers and peasants,
The blood of revolutionary combatants of both sexes,
The bloods spills out into great indignation
and a resolute urge to fight,
17 April, that day under the revolutionary flag,
The blood certainly liberates us from slavery.

Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea

Preamble

On the basis of the sacred and fundamental desires of the people, workers, peasants, and other labourers as well as those of the fighters and cadres of the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army; and

Whereas a significant role has been played by the people, especially the workers, poor peasants, the lower middle peasantry, and other strata of labourers in the countryside and cities, who account for more than ninety-five percent of the entire Kampuchean nation, who assumed the heaviest responsibility in waging the war for the liberation of the nation and the people, made the greatest sacrifices in terms of life, property, and commitment, served the front line relentlessly, and unhesitatingly sacrificed their children and husbands by the thousands for the fight on the battlefield;

Whereas great sacrifices have been borne by the three categories of the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army who fought valiantly, day and night, in the dry and rainy season, underwent all sorts of hardship and misery, shortages of food, medicine, clothing, ammunition, and other commodities in the great war for the liberation of the nation and the people;

Whereas the entire Kampuchean people and the entire Kampuchean Revolutionary Army desire an independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, sovereign Kampuchea enjoying territorial integrity, a national society informed by genuine happiness, equality, justice, and democracy without rich or poor and without exploiters or exploited, a society in which all live harmoniously in great national solidarity and join forces to do manual labour together and increase production for the construction and defence of the country;

And whereas the resolution of the Special National Congress held on 25, 26 and 27 April 1975 solemnly proclaimed recognition and respect for the above desires of the entire people and the entire Kampuchean Revolutionary Army;
The Constitution of Kampuchea states:

Chapter One The State

Article 1 The State of Kampuchea is an independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, sovereign, and democratic State enjoying territorial integrity.

The State of Kampuchea is a State of the people, workers, peasants, and all other Kampuchean labourers.

The official name of the State of Kampuchea is "Democratic Kampuchea".

Chapter Two The Economy

Article 2 All important general means of production are the collective property of the people's State and the common property of the people's collectives.

Property for everyday use remains in private hands.

Chapter Three Culture

Article 3 The culture of Democratic Kampuchea has a national, popular, forward-looking, and healthful character such as will serve the tasks of defending and building Kampuchea into an ever more prosperous country.

This new culture is absolutely opposed to the corrupt, reactionary culture of the various oppressive classes and that of colonialism and imperialism in Kampuchea.

Chapter Four The Principle of Leadership and Work

Article 4 Democratic Kampuchea applies the collective principle in leadership and work.

Chapter Five Legislative Power

Article 5 Legislative power is invested in the representative assembly of the people, workers, peasants, and all other Kampuchean labourers.

This Assembly shall be officially known as the "Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly".

The Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly shall be made up of 250 members, representing the people, the workers, peasants, and all other Kampuchean labourers and the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army. Of these 250, there shall be:

Representing the peasants 150

Representing the labourers and other working people 50

Representing the revolutionary army 50

Article 6 The members of the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly are to be elected by the people through direct and prompt general elections by secret ballot to be held throughout the country every five years.

Article 7 The People's Representative Assembly is responsible for legislation and for defining the various domestic and foreign policies of Democratic Kampuchea.

Chapter Six The Executive Body

Article 8 The administration is a body responsible for executing the laws and political lines of the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly.

The administration is elected by the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly and must be fully responsible to the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly for all its activities inside and outside the country.

Chapter Seven Justice

Article 9 Justice is administered by people's courts, representing and defending the people's justice, defending the democratic rights and liberties of the people, and condemning any activities directed against the people's State or violating the laws of the people's State.

The judges at all levels will be chosen and appointed by the People's Representative Assembly.

Article 10 Actions violating the laws of the people's State are as follows:

Dangerous activities in opposition to the people's State must be condemned to the highest degree.

Other cases are subject to constructive re-education in the framework of the State's or people's organisations.

Chapter Eight The State Presidium

Article 11 Democratic Kampuchea has a State Presidium chosen and appointed by the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly once every five years.

The State Presidium is responsible for representing the State of Democratic Kampuchea inside and outside the country in keeping with the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea and with the laws and political lines of the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly.

The State Presidium is composed as follows: a president, a first vice-president, and a second vice-president.

Chapter Nine

The Rights and Duties of the Individual

Article 12 Every citizen of Kampuchea enjoys full rights to a constantly improving material, spiritual, and cultural life.

Every citizen of Democratic Kampuchea is guaranteed a living.

All workers are the masters of their factories.

All peasants are the masters of the rice paddies and fields.

All other labourers have the right to work.

There is absolutely no unemployment in Democratic Kampuchea.

Article 13 There must be complete equality among all Kampuchean people in an equal, just, democratic, harmonious, and happy society within the great national solidarity for defending and building the country together.

Men and women are fully equal in every respect.

Polygamy is prohibited.

Article 14 It is the duty of all to defend and build the country together in accordance with individual ability and potential.

Chapter Ten

The Capital

Article 15 The capital city of Democratic Kampuchea is Phnom Penh.

Chapter Eleven

The National Flag

Article 16 The design and significance of the Kampuchean national flag are as follows:

The background is red, with a yellow three-towered temple in the middle.

The red background symbolises the revolutionary movement, the resolute and valiant struggle of the Kampuchean people for the liberation, defence, and construction of their country.

The yellow temple symbolises the national traditions of the Kampuchean people, who are defending and building the country to make it ever more prosperous.

Chapter Twelve

The National Emblem

Article 17 The national emblem consists of a network of dikes and canals, which symbolise modern agriculture, and factories, which symbolise industry. These are framed by an oval garland of rice ears, with the inscription "Democratic Kampuchea" at the bottom.

Chapter Thirteen

The National Anthem

Article 18 The national anthem of Democratic Kampuchea is the "Dap Prampi Mesa Chokchey" ["Glorious Seventeenth of April"].

Chapter Fourteen

The Kampuchean Revolutionary Army

Article 19 The three categories of the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army—regular, regional, and guerrilla—form an army of the people made up of men and women fighters and cadres who are the children of the labourers, peasants, and other Kampuchean working people. They defend the State power of the Kampuchean people and of independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, sovereign, and democratic Kampuchea, which enjoys territorial integrity, and at the same time they help to build a country growing more prosperous every day to improve and develop the people's standard of living.

Chapter Fifteen

Worship and Religion

Article 20 Every citizen of Kampuchea has the right to worship according to any religion and the right not to worship according to any religion.

Reactionary religions which are detrimental to Democratic Kampuchea and Kampuchean people are absolutely forbidden.

Chapter Sixteen

Foreign Policy

Article 21 Democratic Kampuchea fervently and earnestly desires to maintain close and friendly relations with all countries sharing a common border and with all those near and distant throughout the world in conformity with the principles of mutual and absolute respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Democratic Kampuchea adheres to a policy of independence, peace, neutrality and non-alignment. It will permit absolutely no foreign country to maintain military bases on its territory and is resolutely opposed to all forms of outside interference in its internal affairs, and to all forms of subversion and aggression against Democratic Kampuchea from outside, whether military, political, cultural, social, diplomatic, or humanitarian.

Democratic Kampuchea refuses all intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, and scrupulously respects the principle that every country is sovereign and entitled to manage and decide its own affairs without outside interference.

Democratic Kampuchea remains absolutely within the great family of non-aligned nations.

Democratic Kampuchea strives to promote solidarity with the peoples of the Third World in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and with peace- and justice-loving people the world over, and to contribute most actively to mutual aid and support in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and in favour of independence, peace, friendship, democracy, justice, and progress in the world.

MANIFESTO OF THE PERIODICAL REVOLUTIONARY YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN

(From Yuvachun Nung Yuvaneari Padevat,

No.1 August 1973,

pp. 1-7.)

In our revolutionary movement today a great many young men and women have actively sought to join together in both the Alliance of Yuv.K.K. [Communist Youth of Kampuchea] and in patriotic organizations. And these numbers are continually growing in an orderly way. Today, all over the country, the membership of the Alliance of Yuv.K.K. counts by tens of thousands of people. In the offices and departments there are tens of thousands of young men and women. In the armed forces of all three categories (village militia, regional forces, regular forces) there are also a great many young men and women. Therefore, if we add them together all over the country, the number of young men and women in our revolutionary ranks adds to hundreds of thousands of people, whether Yuv.K.K troops, in offices and departments both at the front lines and the rear ranks.

In sum, all young men and women in our revolutionary ranks have all received continuous constructive education from the party. Therefore, so far, the movement of young men and women has progressed forward both in building each individual and in building a movement of revolutionary struggle. Our many young men and women have joined in revolutionary activities on all battlefields both at the front lines and in rear areas in overflowing numbers.

In order to explode and push the movement of young men and women toward greater strength in accordance with the actual situation, in accordance with our revolutionary movement which is bounding ahead, our Communist Party of Kampuchea, even though pressed by other matters, nevertheless definitely needs to build an organ to educate-construct-nurture the principle of revolutionary political consciousness in our young men and women following the direction and the policy approach of the party in order that [this principle] becomes more clearly defined. That organ is this periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women which appears monthly. This periodical is an organ of revolutionary youth and is under the aegis of the party.

The intentions of this periodical aim to serve revolutionary young men and women, taken together, but also to serve all progressive young men and women in the ranks, too. This periodical has a direction toward building our young men's and women's political consciousness and their implementation of assignments which will serve the movement to fight and strive in the front lines and the rear areas as well as in the offices and departments.

Therefore, this periodical is a periodical to lead, explode and push the movement of young men and women to do the concrete work of building-nurturing the principle of political consciousness of the party into the revolutionary youth organization and to acquire [for the youth movement] and spread experiences both in the matter of political consciousness and regarding the job of implementing various assignments of the revolutionary youth organization. That is to say [this periodical]:

Politically, aims to disseminate, educate, nurture, orient political principles, strategic and tactical; the approach to people's war of the party; the party's economic approach; the party's socio-cultural approach and the party's foreign policy goals through concrete execution and with experience of building the force of revolutionary young men and women. Mentally, aims to disseminate, construct, nurture a revolutionary consciousness such as:

- class consciousness, class struggle, division into classes so that our youth have a proper class philosophy;
- righteous revolutionary principles;
- national pride, a proper patriotic spirit. Proletarian nationalism and internationalism of our revolutionary movement in order to explode the national principles of the working class, of the party;
- precepts of unrelenting struggle both with the enemy and with nature and in building oneself in order to fulfill duties, large and small, which the party assigns in order to have maximum victory;
- a spirit of serving the nation and people, especially the people of the bas areas;
- revolutionary heroism in the task of fighting the enemy at the front lines, increasing production in the rear area, in fulfilling duties well in offices, etc.
- high spirit of collectivity, ridding oneself of individual interests in favor of the whole, etc

3. In implementing assignments, aims to:

At the front lines explode and push young men and women who are combatants, who are messengers, who are medics, who carry ammunition, food, the wounded, etc., to overcome to fight, rushing to fulfill their individual duties to the maximum; to fight and strive as strongly as possible and always firmly.

In the rear areas explode and push the movement to increase production; the problem of solidarity with the people in general; the problem of doing a job with the people of the bases:

-- increasing pride in the work of manual activities to become closer to the people of the bases;

-- exploding the spirit of the collectivity; spirit of economizing of collective goods and of time in the officers and departments and worksites and individual jobs.

In all, that is, the aim is of building reflexes of our youth toward the overall good and increasing their understanding and desire for manual activities; that is to say, changing their old worldview progressively and causing the adoption of a new, revolutionary worldview as a replacement.

To summarize, the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women has a direction toward building a stand of the political consciousness and implementation of assignments of the party and exploding the movement of young men and women so that it becomes increasingly vigorous and strong in the interest of serving the movement to fight and strive onward both at the front lines and in the rear areas. It also builds reserve strength for perpetuating the leadership of the revolutionary movement generally in the future by taking the revolutionary movement concretely, both at the front lines and in the rear areas and offices, and building it by means of the aspects of political consciousness and the task of implementing various assignment. Therefore, the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women wishes success to the brave young men and women of Kampuchea wishes good health and strength and a quick intelligence as well as a strong principle of revolutionary consciousness in order to raise the battle standard to fight and strive against the enemy on all front to be as strong as possible and continually gain new great victories.

Long Live the brave young men and women of Kampuchea!

Long Live the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women!

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THE FIRST SESSION

IN THE FIRST LEGISLATURE OF KAMPUCHEAN

PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY

April 11-13, 1976

Unofficial Translation By Bun Sou Sour

Documentation Center of Cambodia

Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly's

Plan on Decisions To Be Taken in its First Session, First Legislature

April 13, 1976

Respected and Beloved Kampuchean People's Representatives!

From April 11 to April 13 1976, we have opened meeting both in forms of committee meeting and plenary meeting for discussion, review on all aspects and all qualifications of the agenda of Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly's first session in the first legislature.

Having gone through debates for three consecutive days, the assembly's floor is in unanimous agreement with the basic essence listed on the agenda towards a final decision.

Based on the unanimity provided by our session, the Chairmen of the meeting have prepared a draft of decision to be taken by the People's Representative Assembly's meeting in its first session, first legislature.

We, on behalf of the Chairmen, would like to read out the draft of decision to the floor for final approval and adoption.

Here we go.

After the successful election to choose the members of Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly on March 20, 1976, the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly has conducted its first plenary meeting for the first period.

The first plenary meeting in the first period of People's Representative Assembly was carried out for three days from the morning of April 11 until April 13, 1976 in the capital city of Phnom Penh in a great and warm solidarity atmosphere. The meeting focused on all important issues, which have been declared in the agendas. The issues are thoroughly discussed in accordance with Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea and with great spiritual responsibility for revolution, nation, workers, peasants, laborers, male and female youths, and cadres of Kampuchean Revolutionary Army.

After thorough and full examination of all issues, which are listed in the agendas, finally the assembly has formally adopted the followings:

1. About the Evaluation of the Outcome of the General Election Held on March 20, 1976

The assembly's unanimous adoption: The general election held on March 20, 1976 under careful supervision and monitoring of the election committee and committee of ministry of interior has been conducted meticulously according to the principles of the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea. Workers, peasants, laborers, male and female youths, and cadres of Kampuchean Revolutionary Army have actively participated in the election in a super solidarity atmosphere and with strong belief in the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, in their relative-representatives, and in the anticipation of a brighter future of Democratic Kampuchea of their home country.

2. About the Management of Work Procedures of Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly and the Organization of Standing Committee of the Assembly and Various Committees of the Assembly itself

Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly was founded by the fresh blood of laborers and peasants, which had been flowing like rivers in the struggle and in the fight thousand years ago.

All members of the Assembly are the flesh and blood of workers, peasants, laborers, and Kampuchean Revolutionary Army, who used to join in the revolutionary struggles, underwent hardship and misery together in the fight against imperialism, old and new types of colonialism and its lackeys, experienced happiness and despair together for years, and still, we can now live together in the class of laborers working in factories, railroads, harbors, rubber plantations, salt fields, dike systems in rice fields, and water channels in syndicates, in cooperatives, and in various departments of Kampuchean Revolutionary Army fighting relentlessly to build up our nation and to defense our country.

This is the true background of our representatives; there would be no qualification in term of representativeness and democratic nature better than the above-mentioned

points. So far, until these days and from now on our Assembly shall maintain the nature as laborers, peasants, and our revolutionary army's representatives into the future.

With this viewpoint, the Assembly has unanimously adopted the basic principle of work procedures as follows:

1. Each member of Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly must continue to be representative for their previous local bases, sharing misery and happiness with people, trying to understand the feeling of the people, and make sure to be informed about people's requests, especially staying closely with syndicates and factories, cooperatives, dike and irrigation systems, work sites, their own units, participate in building up and defense the country with workers and peasants people, laborers, male and female youths and cadres of Kampuchean Revolutionary Army in order to suit their ranks of real representatives of workers and peasants people, laborers, and Kampuchean Revolutionary Army.

2. Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly shall conduct a plenary meeting once a year, in order to promote annually the political line inside and outside of the country and to observe the activities of the state presidium, government, and judicial committee. They shall also observe good and bad points and rectify annual work targets of the three state organs.

3. During the period between each plenary meeting of Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly, there shall be a permanent organization of Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly which is responsible for practicing and observing the practice and decisions of the plenary meetings of the Assembly. This organization is called Standing Committee of Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly.

At the same time, the Assembly has also selected members of the Standing Committee of Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly and has also chosen members of other commissions of the Assembly.

The Standing Committee of Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly is composed as follows:

1. Comrade Nuon Chea, President
2. Comrade Nguon Kang, First Vice-president
3. Comrade Peou Sou, Second Vice-president
4. Female Comrade Ruos Nim, Member

5. Comrade Sar San, Member
6. Comrade My Chham, Member
7. Comrade Kheng Sokh, Member
8. Comrade Matt Ly, Member
9. Comrade Thang Sy, Member
10. Comrade Ruos Preap, Member

3. About the Examination, Judgement and Decision on the Request for Retirement by King Norodom Sihanouk by virtue of the his statement dated April 2, 1976 and the Government Statement dated April 4, 1976 on the Request for Retirement of the King dispatched to the assembly

Having thoroughly examined and discussed the two statements, the People's Representative Assembly unanimously does hereby agree with the request for retirement of King Norodom Sihanouk.

By virtue of the great achievement of King Norodom Sihanouk, a patriotic monarch who has paid interest-bearing contribution to the nation and the people of Kampuchea for national liberation against heinous and barbarous aggressive war of American imperialism and its reactionary clique of traitors, including Lon Noll, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, Cheng Heng, In Tam, Long Boret, Sosten, the National Assembly does hereby agree with the government's requests in the following:

1. Entitle King Sihanouk "The Hero with the Highest Patriotism".
2. Build a memorial for inscribing his aforementioned achievement.
3. Guarantee King Sihanouk's and his family's living standard as high as his honor and his status as Head of State and President of National Liberation Front of Kampuchea with a yearly pension amounted to US\$8.000.

4. About the Examination, Judgement and Decision on the Request for Retirement of the Former Government

The People's Representative Assembly notes that the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, previously known as Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia [RGNUC] and established on May 5, 1970, has, in co-operation with the people of Kampuchea as a whole and the revolutionary army of Kampuchea, made great efforts to fulfill its task of waging People's War for the liberation of nation and the people against American imperialism and its reactionary clique consisting of Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, Cheng Heng, In Tam, Long Boret, Sosten until the day of victory? April 17, 1975.

Given the whole country was liberated, and in accordance with the decision taken by the special national congress along with the decision made by the Third National Congress, the government jointly arranged for an establishment of the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, its promulgation and for the election of Representative Assembly of Kampuchea. The government, having accomplished major achievements, asks for resignation on April 6, 1976.

The People's Representative Assembly unanimously agrees with the former government's resignation.

5. Election of the State Presidium of Democratic Kampuchea

Having painstakingly discussed the qualifications of all aspects, the People's Representative Assembly elects and appoints the State Presidium of Democratic Kampuchea, which is composed of:

1. Comrade Khieu Samphan, President
2. Comrade Sao Phim, First Vice-president
3. Comrade Ruos Nhim, Second Vice-president

6. Election of the New Government of Democratic Kampuchea

Having painstakingly discussed the qualifications of all aspects, the People's Representative Assembly chooses the new government of Democratic Kampuchea, which is composed of:

1. Comrade Pol Pot, Prime Minister
2. Comrade Ieng Sary, Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs
3. Comrade Vorn Vet, Deputy Prime Minister for Economics
4. Comrade Son Sen, Deputy Prime Minister for Defense
5. Comrade Hou Nim, Minister of Propaganda and Information
6. Comrade Chuon Choeun, Minister of Health
7. Female Comrade Ieng Thirith, Minister of Social Affairs
8. Comrade Tauch Toeun, Minister of Public Affairs
9. Female Comrade Yon Yat, Minister of Culture and Education

The committees within the government framework and put in charge of economics are in the following:

1. Committee of Agriculture
2. Committee of Industry
3. Committee of Commerce
4. Committee of Communication
5. Committee of Power
6. Committee of Rubber Plantation

The Chief of each committee is equivalent in rank to Minister of the government of Democratic Kampuchea.

7. Election of Judicial Committee

Having thoroughly discussed, the People's Representative Assembly elects and appoints a judicial committee chaired by Kang Chap.

8. People's Representative Assembly's Guidelines On Domestic and Foreign Policies of the State Presidium and the New Government of Democratic Kampuchea

The following are unanimously adopted domestic and foreign policies to be implemented by the new government of Democratic Kampuchea:

1) All articles and chapters of the constitution of the Democratic Kampuchea shall be correctly, completely, and cohesively implemented. The constitution of the Democratic Kampuchea is the soul of Democratic Kampuchea and the basis for domestic and foreign policies on various fields ranging from political economy, social affairs, culture, which stems from the fresh blood of millions of children of Kampuchea of several generations. Therefore, there shall be respect, observation and implementation at full strength.

2) Strengthen and extend the force of great national solidarity with higher revolutionary vigilance for defense of the country, territory, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity within the existing boundaries and with high responsibility for the revolution, nation and our people of Kampuchea.

3) Strengthen and extend the force of great national solidarity for shock assaults in terms of production of all fields, especially agricultural field to the point that a maximum yield of rice shall be reached for upgrading the living standard of our people and building our country with the speed of great leap forwards.

4)Continue to implement political line of independence, peace, neutrality, and non-alignment of Democratic Kampuchea by virtue of article 21 of the constitution of Democratic Kampuchea.

There shall be strengthening and extension of the solidarity and fraternity with all revolutionary movements in various countries in the world, near and far, and with figures and youth in the five continents, who love peace and justice, including the ones in the United States of America, in order to struggle against imperialism, old and new colonies and reactionary forces for the sake of the revolution, independence, peace, democracy, fraternity and social development in the international arena.

The first session in the first legislature of the People's Representative Assembly concluded on the evening of April 13, 1976 with great success, revolutionary optimism, and strong belief in a glorious future of the nation and people of Kampuchea.

[Unofficial translation by Bunsou Sour; edited by Prof. David Chandler]

MINUTE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE
THE FRONT

11 March 1976

PARTICIPANTS: COMRADE SECRETARY GENERAL [Pol Pot]

COMRADE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL [Noun Chea]

COMRADE VORN [Vorn Vet]

COMRADE KHIEU [Son Sen]

COMRADE HEM [Khieu Samphan]

COMRADE DOEUN

COMRADE TUM

COMRADE TOUCH

AGENDA: SIHANOUK'S RESIGNATION FROM HIS POST

I. Report on the Resignation of Sihanouk

Comrade HEM reported to the Standing Committee on the resignation of Sihanouk.

Sihanouk has sent two letters written in French:

- The first letter conveys his resignation and explains the important reason for which he is resigning. In particular, he emphasizes his various health problems, which do not allow him to continue his work.

- The second letter is a statement addressed to the people of Democratic Kampuchea informing them that he wishes to resign from his post before the 20th March 1976.

During his meeting respectively with the Ambassadors of Mauritania and Senegal, Sihanouk has also indicated that he categorically resigns. But during his meeting with the Chinese Economic Delegation he grumbled about his illnesses...

II. Angkar's Opinion

1. Reason for his Resignation.

There are two: in the long term and in the short term.

A. In the Long Term: it is the difference of "classes", the difference between the grass roots of the Revolution and his own person and family. He cannot live with us. If in the past he was able to remain with us, it was simply because of his strategy. As we no longer go along with his strategy, he can only remain provisionally with us. It is not the first time that Sihanouk has resigned. He did that in 1971 already.

B. In the Short Term: It is a strategic difference together with the grass roots difference. An example was the case when we dispatched our Ambassadors abroad without consulting him. The incident has no importance but he would have thought that we no longer have any need for him. Thus the wrangle over position continues.

But the situation has evolved more thoroughly than before. Outside the country, Sihanouk can work with us. While inside the country he feels completely lost without any future. He is very frustrated. He lacks work, he is bored and the environment that surrounds him, in particular his wife who cries constantly, pushes him to the point that he cannot endure any longer. In the case that he decides to remain with us, that cannot last either, at the most 1 or 2 years. As he wishes to leave, his leaving now is the best.

2. POSITIVE and Negative aspects of his Resignation

A. Positive Aspects for our Revolution :

- All the people of Kampuchea will feel a huge surge of relief. The same applies to all our cadres and military. As far as the world is concerned, there won't be any problem.
- We can resolve the problem of the nomination in our State Organisation easily. And under these conditions we can work peacefully without any obstacles.
- Our work in External Affairs will thus be improved because henceforth we will make the decisions ourselves, we will express our position by ourselves. Without Sihanouk we are clean-cut.

B. Negative Aspects for our Revolution

- On the one hand, Vietnam attacks us and treats us as being too far to the left. Sihanouk has helped us, so why should we drop him? Vietnam will point out to others, saying something bad about us, but good about themselves. But it is a provisional problem only. If in the final analysis we remain very close to them, we shall certainly have no problem.
- On the other hand, the enemy is about to attack us, but we should let them be for say half a month. But even if Sihanouk had not resigned the enemy will always attack us, their spies still exist. If the enemy does not cease attacking us, are we going to suffer? No, because they cannot isolate us.

3. MEASURES to be Taken: two directives

A. First directive: We don't reject him. We ask him to remain in the same position. If he wishes to remain with us, he could remain for 5 months, 1 or 3 years, as long he would like. If he cannot resist, it is not because of us, it is not our fault. In fact he won't be able to remain with us. He and his family can see very well that they won't have well-being. We don't give him any choice, if he does not wish to remain, too bad for him.

Thus we must go and see him and ask him to excuse us for being unable to pay him visits as often as we would like, because we were very busy. We SHOULD acknowledge reception of his letter. That is why we come together to see him. The Situation of our country is very difficult, very poor, the country must face tremendous difficulties. We must resolve all the problems with

national dignity. It is in this way that we can be truly independent. Our position, including that of the government, is of always recognizing his noble contribution, HIS deeds and efforts for the country, in particular in the international arena.

The [Khmer] Nation owes him its gratitude for his highly patriotic contribution, something which our Assembly has already noted in its resolutions. We respect a lot [our] collective decisions once they have been adopted. But we request that he remains with the people. The people will

preserve his nationalist undertakings and we also will congratulate him and will do our utmost to implement the resolution of our extraordinary session of the National Assembly.

B. Second Directive: in the event that he insists on resigning, We thank him. In the recent past we fought together, shoulder to shoulder. We very much regret his resignation. We shall convoke a meeting of the Council of Ministers to take a decision. If he resigns we won't allow him to leave the country. His departure will render the situation complicated to China. The enemy does not cease to condemn and criticize us. If we refuse to allow him to leave, the enemy can criticize us at least for one month.

Certain reasonable attitudes of Sihanouk show a patriotic spirit, but his wife has no patriotic spirit at all. Consequently, if we are not clear in solving this problem, it is possible that unresolved questions will complicate our tasks later on. Thus we should go for the first solution and if that does not work, adopt the second one.

III. ANGKAR'S OPINION (meeting of 13 March 1976)

Comrade HEM made several reports to the Standing Committee on the Sihanouk problem. He has made a categorical decision to resign. He asks Angkar that it TAKE PITY ON him. HE lowers and humbles himself only requesting Angkar that it accepts his resignation. This resignation is not against us...

Comrade Secretary General pointed out that it is an important question to be decided by the Central Committee of the Party. But Comrade Secretary General has already prepared a number of ideas, which WERE supported by the Standing Committee:

1. To forbid Sihanouk from leaving the country is the first measure to be taken.
2. It is necessary to call a meeting of the Council of Ministers to submit to it reports on the matter, in order for the latter to make a decision and, then, to meet Sihanouk once again, with the presence of Penn NOUTH

It is necessary that arrangements be made to record the conversation with Sihanouk. It is necessary to speak to him in such a way for him to keep UP his hopes and allow the recording of his conversation. It is for our documentation.

3. To dispatch telegrams to the sons of Sihanouk asking them to return as soon as possible, pointing out that they must come for the New Year and the National Day celebration. We must solve this problem once and for all. We must also solve it for the interests of our revolution.

4. Is Our Decision TRUE TO Revolutionary Morality?

- a. As the morality of the Revolution or the interests of the Revolution. The morality of the revolution must be based on the interests of the revolution. It is a gain for the revolution. To allow Sihanouk to leave is a loss for the Revolution. In reality, Sihanouk is a meek tiger,

which only has its skin and bones left, without claws and the fangs. HIS beard has also been shaven. Thus all that remains is to wait for the day of his death. But if this old tiger is freed in the street, all the children would certainly be afraid of it. Certain old men that did not know this meek tiger would also be afraid.

b. Sihanouk participated with us in our Revolution despite his differences with us. That is the reason why our Party decided that Sihanouk should become President of Democratic Kampuchea. But Sihanouk refuses. Thus it is up to him, he can remain or not, it is his problem.

We consider him as a Senior Personality. We shall not kill him. But vis-a-vis the people and the Nation, Sihanouk must also be punished for his fault of having massacred the people.

Thus our decision is reasonably taken in every respect. We shall not change it. But if he continues to resist us, we shall take measures to liquidate him.

5. Direction of the Evolution of our Revolution:

Consequently, it is necessary to put an end to feudalism. We have reached this stage. The whole feudal regime has been destroyed and definitively dismantled by the Revolution. The Monarchy existing for over 2000 years has finally been dismantled. We do not have any other alternatives. Reactions will certainly take place, but we must follow the path of the Revolution in order to win.

6. Another Measure to be Taken:

Henceforth, Sihanouk shall not be allowed to meet foreign diplomats. We shall give them valid reasons to explain the situation.

Letter of Honorary Red Flag

From

Communist Party of Kampuchea's Central Committee

To

Male and Female Cadres and all cooperative farmers in the districts of Prasot (Eastern Zone), Kampong Tralach (Western Zone) and Tram Kak (Southwest Zone)

Unofficial translation by Bunsou Sour
Documentation Center of Cambodia

I. Preamble

In order to encourage the active involvement of the masses to achieving the tasks of defending country, continuing and building socialist revolution with the speed of great leap forwards in consecutive years, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, hereby decides that any district with the best qualifications in terms of defending the country, continuing and building the socialist revolution, is entitled to be awarded Honorary Red Flag.

In 1976, when we have just come out of the war, there were shortages of anything. In the face of it, all bases, entities, and ministries upheld the flag of combat, while storming attacks to vigorously fulfil the party's tasks, with the spirit of high devotion. As a result, the political tasks of all fields set for 1976 was achieved with maximum quality, including national defense, protection of our revolutionary outcomes, continuation and building of socialist revolution. Obviously, a concrete foundation was laid for all bases, entities, and ministries to move forward to achieving political tasks of 1977 with great victory in all fields.

In the great revolutionary movement throughout the country in 1976, the party had observed and noted three districts, which can be considered as a role model in the three fields: defense, continuation and construction of socialist revolution.

The three districts are:

- 1. The district of Prasot, Eastern Zone;**
- 2. The district of Kampong Tralach, Western Zone; and**
- 3. The district of Tram Kak, Southwest Zone.**

1. Exemplary fields of production and settlement of problems arising from people's living conditions. The fact is that, these three districts are poor, having farming soil with less quality. Villagers had been living in poor conditions since the old regimes. However, their rice production climaxed as a result of the implementation of the party's 1976 plan. Sufficient seeds were well prepared, problems of people's living were tackled, while much a mount of rice went to the state.

2. Exemplary stand: Independence, self-reliance in fulfilling the tasks of building socialism, in order to achieve the party's plan of three tons per hectare.
3. Exemplary stand of socialist revolution: Good work in this field. Active involvement and deep engagement in class struggle in the whole districts, especially in the party.
4. Exemplary stand of collectivism, devotion, consciousness of broad solidarity, both in the frameworks of district, region, and zone.

In recognition thereof, the CPK's Central Committee, decides to award Honorary Red Flag 1976 to these three districts.

II. Honorary Red Flag Award

Respected and Beloved male and female cadres and all cooperative farmers of the districts of Prasot, Kampong Tralach and Tram Kak:

In 1976, which had just passed by, all of you, both cadres, male and female cadres and cooperative farmers, heightened our spirit of sever struggle with the stand of independence and self-mastery in breaking obstacles of all kinds. Eventually, you all have your jobs well done in the fields of national defense, protection of our revolutionary outcomes, continuation and construction of the socialist revolution. This make the three districts of yours enjoy rapid progress, which is qualified as model of 1976 for the whole country, aiming to provoke a movement committed to achieve the party's 1977 plan with the speed of great leap forwards in all fields.

1. Exemplary fields of production and settlement of problems arising from people's living conditions. The fact is that these three districts were poor, having farming soil with less quality. Villagers had been living in poor conditions since the old regimes. However, their rice production climaxed as a result of the implementation of the party's 1976 plan. Sufficient seeds were prepared, problems of people's living were tackled, while much a mount of rice went to the state.
2. Exemplary stand: Independence, self-reliance in fulfilling the tasks of building socialism, in order to achieve the party's plan of three tons per hectare.
3. Exemplary stand of socialist revolution: Good work in this field. Active involvement and deep engagement in class struggle in the whole districts, especially in the party.
4. Exemplary stand of collectivism, devotion, consciousness of broad solidarity, both in the frameworks of district, region, and zone.

This is a prominent victory of your comrades. Also, it is the prominent victory for our people as a whole, our army, our revolution and our party.

This is a significant contribution to the promotion of country defense, socialist revolutionary movement and construction of the socialist revolution, settlement of problems arising from the people's living.

Therefore, the CPK's Central Committee would like to appreciate with revolutionary sentiment?touched and warm?to your cadres, and in recognition thereof, award Honorary Red Flag 1976 to all of you.

Beloved comrades,

Your districts have received the Honorary Red Flag 1976 from the party. This is a great honor for our party, our cooperative workers and farmers of the whole country as well

as our army to award your comrades. It does imply that your tasks have been finished by this moment. All beloved comrades have to further extend your exemplary qualifications by:

1. Strengthen and extend the 1976 triumph of yours, by drawing on the past experiences in political, ideological, and organization fields, force distribution, technical work, defense tasks, continuation and construction of socialist revolution, etc.
2. Further strengthen and extend the stand of collectivism, socialism, self-mastery, high spirit of revolutionary responsibility, stand of overcoming obstacles of any sorts, for the sake of more successes. In doing so, there must be firm stand, constant revolutionary politeness, thorough internal solidarity and solidarity with other bases.
3. Model upon the general revolutionary heroism of our people, cooperative workers and farmers. Our army's valiancy is also to be copied. By doing so, your comrades will improve yourselves rapidly in the party's political, ideological and organizational fields for the sake of your beloved comrades' district progress following the plan of 1977 and the years to come.
4. Based on your comrades' basic qualifications, combined with the active engagement, comrades have to achieve the party's 1976 plan of 3-6 tons per hectare without fail. Surplus would also be awarded.

With the warmest and deepest revolutionary sentiment, the CPK's Central Committee would like to wish your comrades consecutive successes in fulfilling the brilliant tasks assigned by the party.

The CPK's Central Committee is strongly convinced that other districts and bases will achieve the party's 1977 plan in all fields, like the districts of Prasot, Kampong Tralach, and Tramkak, and even bring about more improvement. Accept, comrades, our greetings with the warmest revolutionary fraternity.

June 30, 1977

Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea

Drawing experiences on the political, ideological and organizational stands in the great revolutionary movement of the first six months of 1977

Requests of this text:

1. The great revolutionary movement under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in the past 6 months met a number of problems, enriching us with even more knowledge of political, ideological and organizational stands in defending the country, protecting the authority of the revolutionary workers and farmers for the continuation and construction of the socialist revolution. We altogether do the best to conduct research and shed more light to the main lessons, which are either principles or guidelines for the future practice.

Draw on the experiences and find more directions to attack enemies for defending the country, protect the revolutionary authority of workers and farmers of the party. Draw on the better experiences and find directions which motivate the construction of socialism, significantly the implementation of the 1977 plan, in the fields of country building and settlement of people's living problems. We have to find out keys to them so that more storming attacks would be launched.

We have to be clear on the issues of leadership. Leadership in the party, in all bases?from the highest to the lowest levels.

2. In order to be well prepared for the ultimate attacks in the second half of 1977, leading to a complete achievement of the 1977 plan in all fields.

Therefore, to reach this goal, we raise a variety of issues, which have already been done in 1977, for examination:

We draw on:

1. Tasks of defending the country, [and] revolutionary authority of workers and farmers of the party.
2. Tasks of making socialist revolution.
3. Tasks of building socialism, achieving 3-6 tons per hectare.

I. Tasks of defending the country of Democratic Kampuchea, protecting the revolutionary outcomes, the revolutionary authority, the party, the classes, people and the revolution army of Kampuchea.

1. Country defense?External Affairs.

As far as the country defense is concerned, in general, we are in complete control and self-mastery of all boundaries: land boundary [and] territorial water, sharing borders with other foreign countries.

The main reasons that our collective people and revolutionary army achieved this work:

- [They] have implemented correctly and thoroughly according to the party's political lines on country defense.
- [They] have had stand of high revolutionary vigilance toward the enemies.
- [They] have had correct line of activities in the field of defending the country.

In the country defense movement, i.e. external affairs, we perform correctly and thoroughly according to the party's country defense political lines. The following are our experiences of political and ideological stand:

- Our party, people, and revolutionary army, know even more clearly the image of the enemies without any confusion and dubiety. Our stand of limiting friend-and-enemy is strengthened among our party, people, and revolutionary army by the way the enemies committed against us: aggression, expansion, shelling, strafing, espionage, sabotage, stealing of cattle, annexation of land for cultivation along the border areas.

Based on the vivid definition, we enjoy even more active wrath-abetting movement towards enemies of our nation, people, revolution, worker-class, collective socialism, and of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. At the same time, stand of patriotic consciousness, loving people, loving the revolution, loving the worker class, loving the collective socialism and the loving party are strengthened.

- [We] become increasingly aware of and adhere to the stand of high responsibility in the area of defense of the Democratic Kampuchea.
- Moreover, going through the country defense movement, certain negative stands are abolished: middle-of-the-road stand, country defense in an inactive manner, country construction-ism, seeing no antagonism with the enemies of our nation.

To sum up, our party, people, and revolutionary army manage to defend the country with complete self-mastery, based on the party's correct stand and guidelines on country defense.

2. Defending the country, the revolutionary authority of workers and farmers within the country.

1. Country defense among the people:

The country defense among the people are moving on track because of good awareness and implementation of solidarity guideline, [and] outstanding gathering of party's forces. More significantly, poor worker and peasant class and middle class farmers are stronger and extended, becoming a solid foundation for the socialist revolutionary movement.

[We must] carry out indoctrination on the political and ideological guidelines among the people, especially those in the local bases. There appears to be more active in terms of this area. Selection, strengthening and extending of organizations are smoothly implemented, making the components among the people become purer.

Meanwhile, [we] settle the problems of people's living step by step, making the people increase their belief in the party, the revolution and revolutionary army.

Drawing on our experience, if revolutionary authority in local bases is settled properly, i.e., if cooperative is strengthened positively and carefully screened, a maximum of people safeguard will be warranted.

2. Defense inside the party and in our rank

Situation of defense inside the party and in our rank is much better than before?in terms of both quantity and quality. Obviously, we have screened the party?from the top to the bottom. Basically, many bases have already been settled, except some which remains to be done later.

The screening of networks of enemies burrowing inside improves the quality of the party, revolutionary army, male and female combatants as well as the quality of a majority of the people, who know the antagonism between us and enemies and other experiences in eliminating burrowing enemies and attacking enemies.

Needless to say, the quality of our party increases, both in political, ideological, and consciousness areas. These experiences should be further acquired from within our party, revolutionary army and people in order to wove into a net for defeating and dealing with burrowing enemies.

However, enemies burrowing inside do not cease to exist yet. The old enemy networks of all sorts are not completely removed. A few remains in bases, entities, offices or ministries.

How can we settle the problems?

1. [We] must hold a clear stand and view that we haven't yet cleaned burrowing enemies a hundred percent. The remainders enjoy extending themselves.
2. [We] must take absolute measure in zero-tolerance manner and without hesitation.

The procedure of eliminating enemies burrowing from within expires four months already. Please be reminded:

1. Encourage and educate the masses in the party, core organizations, revolutionary army and among the people so that they are clearly aware of how the burrowing enemies act. By this way, they will become forces in search of enemies and attacking enemies. The same applies to each ministry, base, and army. We move step by step. Wherever measures (of eliminating enemies) are available, there must be encouragement and education for the masses so that they become forces in search of enemies and eliminating enemies.
2. Essence for searching for the burrowing enemies must be the one of the party's political, ideological and organizational guidelines. Check them up to make sure they are correct. In this context, what is to be taken as a core? The answer is the party. Obviously, party center is the core for the whole country. The same applies to zone, region, district, office, ministry. Each spearhead has to have its core [forces] in sweeping burrowing enemies away.

CERTAIN EXPEREINCES IN ADDITION TO OURS FROM APRIL 1977.

1.To be in self-mastery in advance and to take measure on the right time, there must be a clear view toward the constant antagonism, while holding a clear view that enemies of

all strips have their running-dog agents burrowing within ourselves. Hold this stand in advance, while having the spirit of high revolutionary vigilance. And keep track of any small phenomenon.

2. In order to keep an eye on and search for enemies, [we] must base on our the positive biography, both in a prior and post revolutionary period. It must consist of personal, social and commercial background. Among others, the date of entry into the revolution and name of introducers must be included. We used to work in this field with less attention. This really affected our party's principles, making the enemies burrowing within [our party] increased in number. We didn't expect that we paid such less attention. We held subjective view. Some elements came closer to hold important positions. These individuals have had connections since 1955. Generally speaking, [they have been] with the movement for a long time. Yet, we were morally lax in grasping hold of their histories. We didn't know their circles before their entry into the revolution.

3. In order to make sure whether they are bad or good elements, enemies or non-enemies, there must be examination of application of the party's guidelines. How they practice the party's political guidelines? How are their political, ideological and organizational realities? How their implementation of country defense guidelines? How do they work in terms of socialist revolution [and] construction of the socialism. Left[ism] is wrong; right[ism] is wrong. One, two, or many leftist activities or systematic rightist activities cause a problem. Where complicated problems occur consecutively which can not be solved, that is problem. Consecutively practicing socialist revolution with leftism and rightism is problem. Moral laxness in practicing the guidelines of the construction of socialism is problem. Failing to solve the problem of people's living on a constant basis is problem. Our experiences show:

- In certain zones, traitorous elements burrowed from within and implemented systematic political, ideological and organizational activities in the wrong ways. They were morally wrong in the systematic manner. Shortcomings occurred one after another.
- There were always disputes among districts, which share the borders with each other. We knew that there had to be enemies, who, by our assumption, were new evacuees.

From the above experiences, we assume that both the country defense, socialist revolution, and construction of socialism must be based on political position, fighting the enemies until gaining victory. If we could not attack enemies burrowing inside, it does not make sense to win victory in the field of country defense, socialist revolution [and] construction of socialism. Only getting rid of enemies burrowing inside from small and big organizations, do it means that we can implement the party's guidelines. Real example from 1976 is evident. Therefore, we must basically rely on the fight against enemies in order to defend the country, make the socialist revolution and build socialism. Our masses must be aware of this issue. We must constantly fight the enemies. Fight and then substitute our core [agents]. Masses can also be our core [agents].

4. Problems arising from our activities of attacking enemies. Class issue become even more complicated. Many of traitors are petty bourgeois class. Among which there are a few peasant class, who actually have no nature of peasants. They become fake petty bourgeoisie, whose performance are overwhelmed with joy.

In summary, it appears that enemies find it so easy to lure [people] on the petty bourgeois circle, because such a class enjoy individualism, dogmatism, resentment, [and] have tendency to confession [admission]. Their speech, even a word, is always in fluctuating manner.

Other peasants, in bases or ministries, who are also traitors:

- Some of them have been an enemy agent for long time ago or elements are by the side of enemies.
- Many others are those who are under the control of petty bourgeoisie. They don't understand; they can not awake, as the petty bourgeoisie always curb them. The petty bourgeoisie prevent them from enjoying the guidelines, rights, [and] party's statute.

In other words, petty bourgeoisie are a source easy to be convinced by enemies. They take the victorious occasion as a time for over-enjoyment, drinking, in a debauchery manner...

Resentment, in any circumstances, and more or less, makes ways for enemies to carry out their enticement. The problem is the jealousy stemming from position promotion in different times and other contradictions. Taking this opportunity, enemies try to provoke troubles, while petty bourgeoisie are motivating others to feel resentment toward the party.

Worse still, it brings about frustration and complicated situation. It implies that all circumstances in favor of enemies are available. This is an experience. The petty bourgeoisie [of this kind] include those from cities, rural areas, those who give up monkhood, or middle-class peasants or vendor-peasants. Enemies find it harder to entice base people than middle-class. So, we have to stand firmly on the party's guidelines. Before we implemented the party's guidelines. But we were morally lax. From now on we have to practice the party's class guidelines with great quality, tantamount to "great leap forward".

5. Another experience, we have to rely on the masses to attack enemies. In doing so, masses have to be educated about political and ideological areas so that enemies could not be broadened.

For example, we have established a new place [of new elements]. Once we went to that place, we were not able to find all enemies, while enemies were able to carry out their activities to some degree, as the masses were not aware of that. We encouraged the masses. As a result, they found enemies one after another. Therefore, we have to make the masses understand, and the party have to be the backbone of the masses.

Experiences from another place. We made the masses convinced. If they were confident in the ministerial committee(s), they would report to the committees [and] party branches. They did not produce anonymous reports. Yet, they had to be completely responsible for the reports. Experiences tell us that bases also can do this job.

II. Implementation of tasks of the continuation of the party's socialist revolution

We have strengthened and extended our collective socialism. As the collectivism of proletarian class are not to shake and reject, and due to the mass movements under the leadership of the party, on the one hand we manage to control situation where we eliminate all oppressing class, which are becoming faint gradually. On the other hand, all private regimes can not raise their heads. They are under the control of the mass movement, who

are going deeper. The tools of the oppressing class, namely currency, market, etc., can not be returned. The mass movement are in the process of curbing it. This is a phenomenon, indicating our victory in the continuation of the socialist revolution. Enemies of all strips are not able to re-exist. Instead, they are on the way to a complete collapse.

In this situation, we continue to storm attacks to sweep enemies away. Defeat and attack such enemies as international agents, enemies burrowing inside, class enemies to a degree that they could not make any reaction, even a little.

Another advantage is spirit of consciousness inside the party, the army, poor peasants and lower middle-class farmers and middle-class farmers. They are satisfied with the socialist revolution. This is the consciousness of political and ideological areas.

In the last six month, our people worked vigorously with revolutionary optimism. This is recognized by the way they:

1. have enough to eat, good health and are satisfied with the collectivism. Moreover, they are enjoying better shelters and medicines for the safeguards of themselves as well as their children. During the post-war period, our brothers and sisters see outcomes themselves. That's why the revolutionary movement in the field of country construction become very active with revolutionary optimism. They are content to have reservoirs, dams [and] canals. They witness the accomplishments of themselves and of the poor farmers and middle-class farmers. They are contented and feel proud. Most of them are absolute. Poor farmers, lower middle-class farmers and middle-class farmers general farmers, and even petty landlords who had suffered the war of aggression are also happy. New components following April 17, [1975] also accept this regime.

In total, 95 per cent acknowledge the collectivism of the party's proletarian class.

At the same time, shortcomings still occur. People and [those] in the [revolutionary] rank lack awareness of the brilliant collectivism. The reasons are:

1. our party has not encourages the involvement of the local masses; and
2. the enemies in the rank deviate and indoctrinate wrong concept.

From now on, the revolutionary army, male and female combatants, young and old, must be educated from the top to the bottom. Their level for education have to be classified. Education at lower level must be deeper. In case of mixed components, there must be stretch-out education.

Dig up people forces for their potential engagement along with political and ideological indoctrination. Just a meeting a lone will not do. Indoctrination must be the must.

Our second shortcoming is that food ration of our people in this raining season is reduced a little bit. It makes people feel upset to some degree. Of course, we have to solve this problem. It must be done as our collectivism is fantastic. Our mobile units can be moved to anywhere. They can build reservoir, plant potatoes, banana, etc. However, the management of forces are not appropriate yet. Obviously, not all of the forces are used.

The fact that enemies burrow within and destroy us must be found. Yet, another problem is that we are not able to cope with this problem, although we have ability to do so. Guidelines on effective implementation and guidelines on effective combat are also not well performed. These must be examined and experience must be drawn.

To review, does it effect the field of guidelines on activities or ideological responsibility of the people? Can our shortcomings be worked out? The main issue lies in the collective leadership. The drought in our country is not as sever as in other countries. Irrigation is also the same case. There must be consecutive farming cycles here, regardless

who small the farming is. By doing so, there will be success. In some places, they don't do farming, although water is available. They wait for big farming, which needs too much water that we cannot supply. Instead, if one or two hectare of land is cultivated subsequently, there will be no problem of water. In other places, there is enough water, but transplanted rice seedlings are not enough. It is simply because of deviation from collective leadership.

Some other places try not to save the water, while the water is available. This is a point to transform disadvantage into advantage. This is just an issue of rice farming. The same case applies to diversification of crops.

Therefore, there must be solution based on this guidelines?doing farming, both big, medium and small size. Other crops have to be planted. Each house can have 4-5 clumps of sugarcane, and 3-4 clusters of banana. The possibilities vary according to the size of farmland. By doing this, houses will be surrounded with a variety of crops. It's not hard to do so. It can be divided into two types: cooperative and individual plantation. This will contribute to improving living standard, leading to the extension of our collective.

Why strengthening and extending collective? The answer is to build the country, gain support from foreign friends and to defend the country well.

This requires collective leadership. Sometimes commune and district lack [leadership]. So, they need comments from region, which, in case of need, requires comments from zone.

III. The party's tasks of construction of socialism in all fields

In the past six months, construction of socialism enjoyed much progress in all fields: agriculture, industry, social affairs, health, culture and training and education. Our success is classified as a network of "Great leap forward". Obviously, many unit throughout the country have achieved their plan in this way. However, a few unit haven't done as good. They was so slow.

The unit moving with the speed of great leap forward is the unit responsible for irrigation system. Once we achieve plan of each base, we have to move on to another. We build irrigation system in a strategic way to supply one or two cycles of harvest per year. It is really strategic for cultivation. This is the strong movement in the history of Cambodia. "Strong" here implies the gathering of many forces in just a short term for this year's harvest. This is our good, basic point.

This year's work will determine the 1978's plan. There will be no difficulties. By this current, in 1980 we will have enough water to guarantee two harvest cycles per year. Early this year sees difficulties in the area of water. However, we still can achieve our goal as we have irrigation position. To see its advantages, the irrigation must be protected and extended. In each zone, there are many major dams. The whole country also has such number and quantity. We have never expected that our people can do such a thing in just a short period of time. We build the dams, each of which is as big as or bigger than Baray Toek Thla. We made it only three or four months. That's why our people strongly believe[us].

Besides, there were many other units, including Sre Ambil, some dry season rice paddies, rubber plantations, section for producing water-pump. These sections were moving to some extend with the speed of great leap forward, by achieving the 1977 plan. Some units produced much more than others, while some units achieved the 6-month plan.

Some sections of social affairs [and] culture moved with the speed of great leap. For example, we managed to reduce infectious disease, malaria, by 70 per cent. This is not the result of equipment, rather it is because of our quick mass movement.

Our technical section also enjoy such rapid progress, namely section of electricity, chemistry,... This leads us to believe that our children are logically able to grasp hold of technical aspect for building the country.

We believe that we will be able to build up economic foundation with independence and self-mastery.

However, in constructing socialism in all fields for this six month, the 3-6 ton per hectare is still problem because self-mastery does not exist yet, and due to objective and subjective factors.

For objective factor, natural phenomenon?drought?has a maximum negative impact not only on our rice this early year, but also on other crops.

Yet, we have to raise our shortcomings for discussion. Obstacles produce experiences. Natural obstacle is a good lesson. Do not take it as a bad lesson and let it go unsettled. If we don't solve this problem, we can not prevail over the movement. National obstacles do not exist only in our country. Other countries have to overcome the same ones, which are even bigger than ours. It affects a series of sections, agriculture, industry.... They solve this problem, which appears to be harder. Nature changes a lot. This fact makes us consider this problem as a lesson. Settle the problem of water on time and extend this field until we are in self-mastery.

Initially and strategically we have to settle the problem of water supply.

Second, make good use of the existing water. Take opportunity to get it. Don't just wait and use it when they are sufficiently available.

[Early] this year, we dared not to sow seeds for fear that there would be no water [rain]. So, when water is available now, there are no rice seedlings. It means there was no opportunity for farming. Therefore, to build up socialism as planned, self-mastery in the area of water supply is vital. We must settle this problem in the long run.

This year although there is negative impacts on the plan of 3-6 ton per hectare, we are not hopeless, as it doesn't mean we have no water foundation. Intensive attacks have to be made in all forms, ranging from small, medium to big, and [we must be] ready for the self-mastery by the end of this year. There must be determination on where should long-term rice be cultivated, where to have two time harvest per year, although it appears to have rush period. Start transplanting rice seedlings in January. It is not late to harvest two times in 1978. So, there must be readiness. If we farm mid-term rice, we will harvest two and a half times per year. Thus, it will do. But, it will take two additional months from 1978. It means that 1977 will stretch to 14 months. This is our view on strategic plan. In doing so, seeds and forces have to be prepared. Plan to work in sections, fields, have to be clear. There is no need to prepare these things by the end of each harvest season. There must be preparation in advance. This is a main issue, as it relates to the plan of 3-6 ton per hectare. If it is evident that early in farming season there is no water, we can not let this problem go. Meanwhile, where there is not enough water for rice farming, there must be other choices?planting potatoes, giant gourd, gourd, pumpkin, etc.

Our party prioritizes the movement of achieving the 1977 plan in order to upgrade the quality of the party itself. Of course, there are obstacles, and they will not cease to exist. We, altogether, have to tackle the problems. Guidelines for storming attacks must be set; do whatever needs to be done for reaching the goal of 3-6 tons per hectare.

IV. People's Living Conditions

Generally speaking, in the past six months, our people's living conditions are improved, meaning the party's regiment are implemented. So, it implies that there are active movements for socialist revolution and construction of socialism.

In comparison, it is better than last year. However, referring to the party's assignment to storm attack in farming rainy season rice, there are shortcomings. This fact, on the one hand, may affect the momentum of farming movement, and on the other hand, may affect health to some degree.

How to settle? Solve [the problems] throughout the country, starting from each base. It must be done without fail, for the near future and far future.

Try harder to solve these raised problems. In doing so, there must be force division based on correct guidelines of activities, which are in the following:

1. Strengthen the responsibility for the people's living standards;
2. Organize commanders of all levels in a good manner; and
3. Assign forces in accordance with the correct guidelines of activities: putting aside any unnecessary tasks, while prioritizing issue of food supply.

Therefore, any forces unnecessary must be taken. The whole country consists of not less unnecessary forces. In some places, at this movement of speaking, there are still people clearing up grass in front of their homes. These forces can be used for the transplantation of potatoes. The same applies to other ministries, meaning that crop growing is not really active yet.

[Our] mission statement is "Anything unnecessary is to be taken out." Construction of dikes is to be continued. However, the guidelines of constructing dikes must also be correct. Our request for the time being is just to curb the water. Therefore, there should be a small-scale construction movement. A maximum of force must be saved for supplying rice paddies with water, growing potatoes, banana, and other crops.

Growing of such industrial crops as quinine [and] a plan for producing balm, can be reduced for a period of time.

The issue of dikes, reservoirs shall be implemented in the same way. [Our] request is to curb the water for a while. Decoration and cleaning will be done later. A limited number of people shall be reserved for finishing the remaining works to be done and for their preservation. Most of the forces have to be sent to production areas, such as growing potatoes, pumpkins, giant gourds, gourds, etc. The rest will be well prepared for plowing, so that we can be in self-mastery and in good position of intensive farming when water is available. Therefore, there must be inspection of each ministry, work site, [and] cooperative. Any usable forces in these respective units have to be taken for food production. Don't use too much forces at a place.

Construction of canals, dikes, [and] reservoirs shall be processed at an ordinary speed, while final decoration shall be suspended. This will waste time for this rainy season rice farming. Work intensively on the growing of crops: potatoes, banana and pumpkins, in addition to rice farming. Weaving tasks also need less speed. Weaving scarves will be okay. But, weaving burlap must be suspended, as we still have some. If elderly men and women jointly grow crops, there will be not less outcomes.

Thus, there are leading committee and organization of forces. These kinds of things must not be promulgated as circular; [We] must go down to the base directly.

By doing so, there will be settlement, as our situation is not so worse that it can not be worked out. [One of] our mission statement is to storm attack with people's war. By this

way, our people as well cadres can draw on this experience. Main stand for resolution is self-support. All of party's forces, people, and revolutionary army must be boiling and very brave. First there will be obstacles to be overcome. Yet, after that there will be a large quantity of crops existing everywhere.

Self-experiment stems from self-conditioning. If we just wait for food [without any action], there will be no experience. The same applies to the whole country and each grass root.

To suit the real situation now, [we] must not do only long-term rice farming alone. There should be farming of mid-term rice for eating, while doing long-term rice for exportation. It takes twelve months to have the long-term rice harvested.

V. Situation of the party's leadership

In the last six months, our party had overcome intensive attacks in all fields: military, the rear, farming, social and cultural affairs, ministries, offices, etc. These movements make the party condition [itself] to much extend. Moreover, the revolutionary movement enables our party to distinguish two aspects:

- First, it shows the trail of traitors burrowing within the party for many years. Destructive elements, no-good element, who do not belong to any running dogs but affect the revolution, also abort as a result of our six-month movement. The movement itself is under the process of screening. Based on [our] observation and experience, such elements will continue to exist.
- Second, however, the party enjoys another degree of quality in the first semester of 1977. By screening traitorous elements and bad elements, the party enjoys relief from pain of abscess [and] venom. Our party is very healthy. Good party candidates and cadres upgrades the political, ideological and organizational quality. Experiences for the movement are also gained. When seeing enemies as network and seeing activities of each network, there must be chains of activities and organization. This is for combat. Many vigorous struggle on several battles bring us so much experiences and quality of the party's leadership at all levels, in terms of political, ideological and organizational quality. The whole country makes such a progress. We implement the party's guidelines based on the forces of the masses and as a result good resolution is shown. Zone, region, district [and] base enjoy the same quality.

In the field of defense, much more improvement is made. Before there were complicated issues, when enemies burrowed to destroy and deviate the party's guidelines. While we are going to do this, they intend to do that, by destroying us subsequently.

By working this out, our party is stronger, and in the process of strengthening and extending.

What experiences result from the six-month combat of construction of party's leadership?

1. It makes us more interested in the class guidelines of the party in organizational field. The six-month experience shows even clearer that local class [grassroots] are more steady than middle and upper classes. Middle class are less steady than local class. Up do now, in all party branches, the local class are at their geographical position, meaning that they don't abandon their place. Most of middle class become enemy networks burrowing within

[their place], make thing more complicated, opposed to the party and the people, and prevent the movement [from progress], intentionally or unintentionally.

Therefore, from now on, there must be better implementation of the party's guidelines. The party always raises the issue of class guidelines. Obviously, in the rank of leadership, local class increase in number. The base itself also enjoys leadership role. However, this is not enough. The future needs more extension of the local class. The base-class ensure classness, class standpoint of the party's workers, and overcome several movements with obstacles, both subjective and objective, meaning that they do not overcome with complicated issues one after another.

Local class must be allowed to extend themselves in the leadership rank. They are needed, as they are better guarantors of the party's policy than the party's ideological and organizational fields.

Ideological field and standpoint are different in the party, although [they are] with the movement subsequently. Local class have their trend toward local class themselves, rather than middle class. Thus, there must be much more communications among the local class. As for the middle class, in the face of party's consecutive education, indoctrination of sentiment toward local class, they are still not stronger than the base-class.

So, it is clear whether which class are more steady. The petty bourgeois and poor farmers enjoy their respective improvement. But, there must be strong [stand.] If not so, the petty bourgeois will conquer. This is class struggle inside the party. However, the class struggle must be based on natural sentiment and stand of every individual.

If the local class hold core position, there will be much guarantee. With the local class difficult and favorable circumstances are nothing different. Their fighting with enemies are more absolute, while production movement of them are also more absolute. This make us understand further, for the sake of unity. However, the local class used to work with non-local class, who did not experience with this movement.

2. In the first half of 1977, we manage to sweep clean networking enemies burrowing within. Drawing from such experience, [we] do not just see movement; [their] biographies are also our target. Who contact who, with introduction from who. [By this way] we know [their] circles, sources, where we can conduct [our] search. Thus, biographies must be examined thoroughly and consecutively. Once [their] biographies are in a firm grasp, we will be confident in the quality of our cadres and party candidates.

With the scope of our revolutionary tasks, our party candidates have many shortcomings, although the quality of our party increases.

How to settle this problem? What strategic ways to be found out?

Based on the [current] situation of our party, a part drops from the movement, while another part is moving forward. Some are moving very fast, while some other moving with medium speed. These kinds of [people] must be conditioned as "new" cadres. "New" here implies "new" charge [and] new duty. Therefore, in the whole party, from the top to branches, there must be selection of the current cadres according to their qualifications. For example, in the branches of district, region, zone or in the army, more work must be increased if our cadres improve in terms of quality. This is one of [our] strategies. This involves not only organizational field, but also ideological field?clean-cut standpoint.

Another way to solve the problem is to recruit new party candidates, as we have outlined. What are the possibilities of recruiting new party candidates so far? There are two aspects.

1. Difficult aspects for extension: Certain core organizations receive negative impact from burrowing enemy. For this case, we do not recruit yet. But it is

better for recruitment of core organization to start from the masses. This way yields better result than recruitment from core organization to the party.

2. Wherever there are control of correct party organizations, there must be attention on the extension, as sources of the previous recruitment are not bad. If so, we have some possibilities of extending our party candidates. However, there must be more thorough examination. Extension should be made, that is to recruit the masses to join the core organizations as they are new forces without entanglement in enemy activities or no-good elements.

VI. Mission statement for 1977

The mission statement for 1977 is *"Storming constant attacks with the great movement of the masses at the speed of great leap forward."*

The basic merits of the statement are in the following:

1. Awareness infiltrates into the party, people, telling them to implement tasks, both big and small, at the speed of great leap forward.
2. Obviously, there are active involvement in all fields. Most of the fields have achieved their goals. This is a real great leap forward, in such fields as building reservoirs, producing salt and agricultural tools, and on the issue of getting rid of malaria, etc.

It shows that the statement raised is the standpoint and guidelines for future operation. There will be need for education and propaganda on this slogan. Posters on this statement shall be made for public awareness.

Yet, shortcomings still exist.

1. The impression on this slogan is still limited. Weak memory still prevails. It is not as strong as a force of fire to push cadres and party candidates to work closely with the masses. It is for this reason that there still some places moving very slow, while other place operating in an ordinary manner. The most impressive example is when we met obstacles? subjective or objective, big or small, there were complicated issues in certain areas. Some places managed to overcome. Some did not.

Obviously, we saw two weaknesses. One was the problem of early rice and the other was food for the people. These two fields did not move with the speed of great leap forward yet. The same weaknesses happened to other fields. For example, the people clothes. There are, of course, cloth, needle, thread, and sawing machines. But in some places there were weaknesses in solving the problems of supplying people with clothes. Crop diversification was still not at the speed of great leap forward?that is making the villages full of crops. Some villages were full with new crops, although water condition is not favorable. Some other villages had had nothing than shelters and the sky. There was no crop. They did not lack forces. Both old and young people were at the rear. There was lack of drinking water for both people and animals. Lack of well, lack of pond. We give examples relating to the putting of the slogan into practice. A portion did with great leap forward, while the other lacked awareness of the slogan in the concrete application in each spearhead.

Why? What experiences we have had on these issues? What are weaknesses?

1. Awareness about the slogan "great leap forward".
 2. Our main battles succeeded objectively: water, rice paddy.
- Most of sub-battles did not manage to do so.

[They] were not aware of the slogan of great leap forward. That was why the rears rarely achieved the goals set. The weaknesses occurred in the areas of [making] wells for drinking and crop diversification. If the rear does not move at the speed of great leap forward, it may affect the battlefield. [Educational campaign was] done for one time, as the rear failed to follow up.

This is a real experience.

What causes the rear less dynamic?

Management of forces at the rear is not correct yet, due to the following factors:

- Don't know how to manage the forces.
- There is no core [member].

For instance, some places saw active movement in farming. However, there was no management, no command at the rear, while many forces were free at home. That is the reason.

Thus, there must be organization. Core members are not necessary to be party candidates or core organizations. Good masses, who are engaged in the labor work, can be our [core] members. Among 10 or 20, there can be 3 to be selected as a committee. By this way, there will be good male and female combatants. Of course, there will be no good elements. But, their activities will show their nature. Even children can be considered as core members among their rank. Only this way can we build up party candidates [and] core members, as they are purely from the movement.

By achieving this plan, both the front and the rear will be strong. The front implies rice, while the rear implies vegetation and growing of trees for fruits jack-fruit and mango. They are not for additional beauty to people's shelters, but for the health and living of the people.

THE PARTY'S INSTRUCTION ON A VARIETY OF MAIN ISSUES IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1977

The party's instruction on a variety of main issues in the second half of 1977 is completely based on the party's political assignments for 1977, additional to the party's instruction in April 1977.

This instruction requests promotion of implementation of 1977 plan assigned by the party toward a hundred success or more in the second half of 1977.

The main issues are in the following:

I. Paying more attention to the extension of the party's leadership

In the first half of 1977, the party experienced the following situations:

Certain elements inside the party, from the top to the bottom, fell from the great revolutionary movement of the masses. They were all strips of enemies agents, burrowing within our party for a long time. Meanwhile, were destructive elements against our party, revolution and the people, acting in higher and lower ranks.

Many party candidates were absolute. They did not fall into the said categories. In stead, they upgraded the quality of their revolution in political, ideological and organizational fields. They are qualified to fulfil the party's tasks.

This is our improvement and great success. On the one hand, we basically managed to eliminate enemies burrowing within the party. On the other hand we managed to purify and make the party active.

However, through the experience, our party are well aware that the enemies still exist. If we let them stay further, they will be able to extend their networks in the position of class enemies, enemies of the revolution and enemies of our nation. Therefore, our party resolves to continue to heighten the revolutionary vigilance and gather force in the whole party, along with revolutionary army and cooperative workers in order to hunt them down. By doing so, our party will be purer and may be purest. There will be neither old nor new enemies of this kind. Such measures must be taken deeply and constantly for our party to be more active in its leadership role in the revolutionary movement of all fields. Our slogans are: "Clean party means strong party, strong revolutionary movement." "Clean party center means strong leadership of revolutionary movement in the whole country." "Clean party branch of zone means strong party branch of the zone, and strong revolutionary movement at village level"...etc.

These slogan makes us examine and decide whether our revolutionary movement is strong or not. The only factor which determines the strength and weakness is the leadership of the party either throughout the country or the party at base level, big and small. In other words, in order for the party to be strong, the party must be clean first. (Clean in terms of political, ideological and organizational standpoints). For the party to be clean, there must be no enemy elements inside the party, who are against and destroy the party. In order for the party to be clean there must be one single political line, single ideological and organizational line. Such criteria as activity and active combat in the party single line are also qualified.

In view of the situation where there are shortages of cadres and party candidates, in comparison to the great revolutionary movement, huge and deep, at the present and for the

future, the party decides that the party must be absolutely strengthened on time, by on the one hand, paying attention to the strengthening and extending this area among base forces of the party: that is to recruit party candidates, core organizations and progressive masses, who are nurseries of base sources, providing cadres outside of the party and inside of our party. The following steps should be followed:

1. Cadres of all levels, from the top to the district, army, ministry, office, must be strengthened and recruited more. Good elements must be recruited in a timely manner, either one or two, in order to increase leadership forces at each level. "Good [elements]" here is referred to basic classness of those who have experienced consecutive revolutionary movements, grasped hold of and practiced the political, ideological and organizational lines, especially those who have overcome obstacles, small and big. "Good" in terms of morality of living. "Good" in terms of clear biography easy for examination from start to finish. Once we have recruited new forces at each party branch subsequently, the leading forces will increase remarkably, in terms of quantity and quality.

2. Pay attention to recruitment among the revolutionary movement of the masses.

- Progressive masses of local class. Recruit them and give them clear assignments, either in cooperative, factory, office, ministry, or military. For example, in cooperative, [we] have to put them at the spearhead of fertilizer, taking care of cattle, growing crops, vegetation, warehouse, barn, plowing tools, ranks, knife, axe, and other agricultural tools, plowing, sowing rice, irrigation, medical field, children, baby, hygiene, etc. Train them in the way that they can try and work at the same time. In the course of learning and working, they should be selected as core members one after another. They must be strengthened. [If] the selected core members are from outside of the party, they must certify at [our] present, especially claim to serve for a long, strategic term.
- Based on the core members, who are progressive masses, there must be selection of good elements in order to extend our core organizations (Yuvakk and Backbone). These core organizations come basically from good sources, classness and revolutionary movement.
- Based on the strengthened and extended core organizations, there must be attention to recruiting new candidates, and they must be selected the soonest through the above structure.

Our request is that from now up to mid-1978 or end of 1978, leading forces must be strong. Their number must be increased (from the central to district, base, army and leaders in ministry). Only by this way can we push the revolutionary movement of 1977-78 toward healthy situation of 1979.

In the meantime, we also must pay attention to build up forces of second category (progressive masses, core organization, and new party candidates). Make them active so that they can extend themselves on time. And in mid-1978 or by 1979, our cooperatives, factories, and army throughout the country will mostly be sharp and have basic forces worth of quality and quantity. With forces of such quantity, by mid-1978 or by the end of 1979 the base forces in combination with forces from the higher level can produce a strong leadership for our revolutionary movement from the end of 1978 or early in 1979 onward.

PRINCIPLES OF FORCE BUILDING

1. [We] must follow the party's organizational principles and extend [forces] as many as possible and subsequently.
2. Must pay attention to extend force as many as possible wherever clean, belonging to no enemies.
3. Pay attention to good elements, without any involvement with enemies.
4. Establish precisely those components, cadres or individuals, who are responsible for such extension, both at zone, region, district, army, or ministry levels, in order to guarantee the quality of the groups in charge of this task. Do not just introduce generally, to avoid the existence of either burrowing enemies or no-good elements, who may be able to extend new forces with their directions.

II. Paying attention to the continuation of attacking external enemies and enemies burrowing inside the revolution, so as to eradicate them.

Our party see clearly our success in the elimination of external and internal enemies in the first half of 1977. This is considered as a historic victory following the one gain on April 17 [1975].

At the same time, however, our party is well aware that both external and internal enemies are still striving to fight against our revolution. This is the nature of contradictions between revolution and anti-revolution, between people and oppressing class, between worker class and capitalists, between collectivism and privatization, between socialism and capitalism, between real Marxism-Lenism and anti-revolutionary revisionists, between self-reliance and aggression-ism, expansionism, colonialism, imperialism, etc. This kind of antagonism exists permanently in the international arena, particularly in our society, while opponent class exist in the world as well as in our society.

Therefore, our party resolves that the whole party, the whole army and the whole population must go on with both external and internal enemies, drawing on the experiences and in compliance with the party principles and slogans of "isolation of enemies". By doing so, [we] can gather forces as many as possible, by strategy number 1, strategy number 2, technique number 1, technique number 2, do whatsoever until the enemies are separated and going to vanish from the international arena one after another.

The request for the second half of 1977 is to pay attention to sweeping cleanly away enemies in bases, especially in cooperatives.

III. Starting the storming attacks to achieve the plan of 3-6 tons per hectare for the second half of 1977.

Based on our basic preparation in combination with the active combat in the first half of 1977, we must encourage the involvement of reaching the goal of 3-6 tons per hectare without fail. To reach this goal, the following issues must be notified:

First is to strengthen and extend the qualification in terms of materials, that is, being self-mastery in water, fertilizer, seeds, fertile soil, farming techniques (sowing, transplanting, plowing, raking, preparing farmland, irrigation, labor force of people, and labor force of animal...etc.

Second is the party's storming attacks. This is a key issue. Continuation must be made to strengthen and extend, and improve commanders on each battle. Go on with political, ideological, and organizational works. Grasp hold of situations of all field, especially the issue of water so that active involvement may happen in small, medium, and large scale: farming mid-term rice, long term rice, and growing other secondary crops. Improve guidelines on effective activities in all fields, such as the use of water, organization of forces for taking care of transplanted rice, sowing and pulling seedlings. These works must be organized according to real circumstances, notably the use of machinery, in order that by the end of this year, these works are done on time and in self-reliance. Sowing, transplanting, and harvesting must be followed one another in order not to waste time.

To simply put, it requires that commanders be strong in all fields so that 3-6 tons per hectare will be achieved from now up to December 1977, but in some places where there are objective obstacles, February 1978.

Our party determines that the rear base must have good management of forces for diversification of crops according to their reasons, (i.e. corn, potatoes), strategic trees for fruits, etc. Commanders of the rear base must be organized with instructions from core members on a daily, ten-day and monthly basis, so as to make the slogans work. "The rear base and the front must work together to achieve the party's 3-6 tons per hectare." "The rear base is the backbone of the front."

IV. Striving to solve and improve the people's living standards as rationed by the party.

Based on the party's ration, the whole party, especially cadres who are responsible for important tasks at all levels, together with our army and people, must endeavor to solve the people's problems of living, to guarantee their health, particularly in three these three consecutive months? July, August, and September. Any places where are qualified must go ahead to achieve the party's plan, while those places where there are weaknesses, must seek alternative solutions to fulfil the plan. For any places where meet too many weaknesses, experiences of 1976 will be their lessons for encouraging the involvement of settling food problems as hard as they can, based on the standpoint of self-mastery, self-reliance, more importantly in order to build and spread the in-depth standpoint of self-mastery and self-reliance among [people in] the bases, army, and the party. This is a deep political and ideological essence, which is a brilliant capital for our progress toward self-mastery and self-reliance. The way to tackle the problem of people living is to push [people] into growing secondary, strategic crops, including sweet potatoes, potatoes, bean, vegetables, water grass, corn, banana, sugarcane, papaya,...etc. By growing such crops, the problem can be settled for the time being and for the future. Meanwhile, there must attention to the issue of rice, which will yield in the near future. The issue of sugar is also to be solved to improve some degree of people's living standard. Besides, there must be mutual support within the framework of district, region, zone, and the whole country in case of shortages of possibilities of solutions.

The party's request is that from the next year dry season, the eating ration must be guaranteed during the whole year. Technical preparation should be made for the purpose of a three-meal ration: breakfast with potatoes, porridge or other foods, plus main lunch and dinner. This plan is to be implemented from 1978. Therefore, the plans of rice production and crop diversification must be achieved in the rear base. Preparation of forces, cooking pots, firewood, is also the must.

Besides food, attention must be paid to the maximum settlement of people's living in other aspects. Improve their living standards, health, hygiene, shelter, clothing, mosquito net, mate, blanket, cooking pots, rice plate, drinking water (wells, small ponds must be made as many as possible in cooperatives).

Our party sees clearly the improvement of our revolutionary movement of Kampuchea, both in the fields of defense of the country, protection of the revolutionary authority, workers and farmers, continuation of socialist revolution, construction of socialism, promulgation of the influence of Kampuchean revolution in the international arena, subjectivity and objectivity. Thus, we are completely convinced that under the leadership of our Communist Party of Kampuchea, with party central, revolutionary army and collective people, being backbone, we must be able to defend the country from now till 1977.

Statement of the Communist Party of Kampuchea [CPK] to the Communist Workers' Party of Denmark, July 1978

by

Nuon Chea

Deputy Secretary, CPK

On behalf of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, I wish to express our deep thanks for your visit to Kampuchea. It is a great honour and a source of encouragement for us to have you here...

I. On Party-building 1960-67

From the beginning we believed it was necessary to have a party led by the working class and to base ourselves upon the contradictions in Kampuchean society. In that period, that is, in 1960, Kampuchean society was neo-colonial and semi-feudal. The contradiction between the Kampuchean nation and US imperialism was very sharp. That was the external contradiction. As for the internal contradiction, it was between, on the one hand the working class and the capitalists and on the other the poor peasants and the feudal class. At that time, capitalists and reactionaries together oppressed our people.

On the basis of these contradictions, the party determined its revolutionary tasks: to make the national democratic revolution; to fight US imperialism and the feudal class; to liberate the Kampuchean nation and the poor peasant class. It laid down this strategic line for the national democratic revolution:

- (1) The party leading the revolution had to be a party of the working class. It had to lead the revolution directly and not allow other classes to lead the revolution or the party. The party had to define the forces of the revolution; firstly, the strategic forces in the revolution and secondly, the tactical forces in the revolution.
- (2) Strategic forces are the workers, peasants and some of the petty bourgeoisie. Of these, we see the working class, as basic class while the petty bourgeoisie was something like allied force. National capitalists were supplementary forces. Moreover, we regarded some high-ranking personalities within the ruling Class-some big capitalists and officials in the civil service and government, and some Buddhist monks -as supplementary forces.

Those people had to have a patriotic, progressive and national outlook, that is, progressive in relation to the reactionaries.

Based on this classification of forces, we tried to construct a national democratic front for the purpose of struggling against US imperialism and its lackey. We wish to stress to you that all of these forces depended upon the leadership of the working class and the party.

- (3) Our party chose two forms of struggle: political struggle and armed struggle. These are interrelated. The political struggle was promoted through legal struggle and illegal struggle, with the illegal being the basic form of struggle. Now we struggle openly and in secret with secret struggle as the basis of our struggle. We define the forms of struggle in this way as a result of our own experience. Defending, expanding and building our forces required working in this way.
- (4) We took up the struggle in the city as well as in the countryside.
- (5) The struggle in the countryside was the basic one, especially the struggle in the most backward and remote areas. Those were base areas.
- (6) We recognized that we had to conduct people's war, to overcome all obstacles, make any sacrifice, so as resolutely and finally to win victory and to launch a final offensive. We resolved never to put ourselves on the defensive but always to take the offensive.
- (7) Our strategic line took as its premises: independence; sovereignty; self-reliance. It was based upon the right to choose our own destiny with dignity.
- (8) Our struggle was based on international solidarity with all brotherly parties in the world and with all peoples and countries in the world who oppose revisionism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and colonialism of any kind.

These principles and practices are not new. They have been recognized around the world, but we review them with you because they reflect our own experiences. We have followed these principles in our struggle and we have learned from them. This line was adopted by the first congress of our party on 30 September 1960.

I would like to stress that putting this line into practice was not easy. Especially before 1970. In 1960, we were badly affected by the twentieth party congress in the Soviet Union. Vietnam also opposed our party line especially the armed struggle, as well as our line of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance. The Vietnamese said we had to make the national democratic revolution on the basis of the documents of the twentieth congress in the Soviet Union. They said it was not clear how the classes in Kampuchea had to be divided. They believed the feudal class had a progressive function in Kampuchea and that it would be able to make the revolution with us. Moreover, they thought the revolution could be achieved through the parliament and on the basis of co-operation among different classes. Then and now, they saw and still see our line as putchist and too much to the left. But we defended our party line. Having correctly defined our party line and our party

activities, we sent most of our cadres to work in the countryside. We kept only a few in the cities.

Our army was built from scratch, from a small army to a big army. In the beginning, we created some secret self-defence corps. We selected the best youth. Almost all cadres had to do illegal work at that time. Only a few worked legally; some in the parliament, some in the administration, some in the press. The legal work was for the purpose of mobilizing popular forces but the basic work was the work done in the countryside and among the workers; it had to be done illegally and secretly. This meant that our enemies-the US imperialists, their lackey and the reactionary classes - could not find out who was leading our revolution. They knew the names of a few comrades such as Khieu Samphan.¹ They thought those comrades were the real leaders of the revolution. But they did not know the real leaders. And as they could take action against known people only, most of our leaders were able to work safely.

During 1960-67, we organized and consolidated many bases in the countryside. The movement in favour of production and against land-owners was very strong. Peasants pitted their strength against the ruling class. They had nothing but used everything: stones, knives, sticks, axes. Some of the wives of poor peasants participated by taking their children to demonstrate in front of the National Assembly. Revolutionary forces in the rural areas were very strong then. We let our party members from the working class go there to work among the poor and middle peasants.

In the cities, there was a related movement among workers and students. They demanded that the government cut off US aid and kick out the US ambassador. Demonstrators burnt the US flag and the embassy.²

- In the countryside, the movement of the people ignited. Those who were hungry rose up against traitors, reactionaries and agents of the administration. The slogan was 'Make the National Democratic Revolution', that is, fight US imperialism. The spirit of patriotism was very high. Everybody felt they had to fight US imperialism. But we divided the struggle into two parts: the national struggle and the democratic struggle. In the latter, we raised slogans demanding rights for students, workers and peasants; higher wages; land to the peasants; better prices for rice, bean curd and meat and better living conditions for the people. The struggle embraced big issues and small and involved all regions and means. The enemy tried to suppress us but failed because we fought legally and secretly, big and little battles at the same time. In this way, we were able to defend and strengthen revolutionary forces step-by-step.

-Through struggle, we built up the leadership of the party, recruiting good cadres from among the workers, peasants, civil servants in the administration, Buddhist monks and women. In struggle we were able to temper cadres from all strata. Thus the contradictions in our society deepened, the contradictions between workers and capitalists, between the peasants and landlords, between workers and government officials. The enemy tried harder to suppress our movement. In this situation, confronting these acute contradictions, we had a Central Committee meeting. We decided we could no longer

continue the legal struggle. And that we had to start the uprising. This was in January 1968.

The Soviet ambassador in Phnom Penh opposed us. The Soviets said our party was out of its mind to launch armed struggle. They began to build a new party aimed against us, gathering people who had surrendered to the enemy and who were traitors, opportunists and vagabonds. Vietnam also opposed our armed struggle. Vietnamese cadres took action against us, by sneaking around giving our cadres pamphlets such as Lenin's *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*. They said we were too left.

We tell you this in order to point out that Vietnam did not help us! A lot of people misunderstand this. It was at that moment that our party consolidated its position as independent and sovereign. We realized our case was different. We had to take account of the concrete situation in order to resolve our social contradictions. Perhaps it is different in other places, but this is what it was like here. We had to determine our line on the basis of our own contradictions. The situation was favourable for armed struggle. Because our party was united on this principle and this line and our people supported the revolution wholeheartedly, the uprising against the ruling classes began in 17 out of 19 provinces. We had no weapons to speak of and no aid from outside. We had only a few carbines captured from the enemy. Sometimes we had weapons but no ammunition. Sometimes even if we had no ammunition we carried rifles so as to frighten the enemy. Step-by-step we were able to expand our forces because we followed the party line of people's war.

II. The Armed Struggle, 1968-75

The people gave us support by hiding food and by hiding our guerrilla forces and cadres. This taught our cadres to be vigilant in following the party line of combining with the masses and relying upon the masses. Our army was not very big then. It fought with bows and arrows, especially in the northeast base areas. We gained the confidence of the people by showing them that traditional weapons could kill the enemy. The people then believed in the party line and in the revolution. The enemy used all kinds of weapons especially in the northeast where our Central Committee had its base. But this region was very strong; the enemy could not do a thing to us. However, the Vietnamese revolution was in trouble then because the enemy had built strategic villages in South Vietnam. Having no land to escape to, the Vietnamese asked us for refuge and got it. This led to the 18 March 1970 *coup d'état* of the US.

The US sought to destroy our revolution, but as we were strong, we began establishing our own state power in the liberated areas. We were successful immediately in 70 per cent of the rural areas; if the US had not invaded, we could have liberated the whole country by June 1970. In 1967-68 many people said we were ultra-leftist; in 1970, everyone agreed we had the correct position. Everyone followed us. Socialist countries and other countries around the world supported us, enabling us to continue our economic, military and international work better than before. But I would like to stress that even with favourable conditions we kept the existence of our party secret and we continued to build upon the secret struggle as a

fundamental tactic. We became masters of the situation because we had our bases in the rural areas, and because we had the forces of the united front.³

At first, we did not notice our contradictions with Vietnam. To be frank, we thought the Vietnamese were our friends. But instead of helping us Vietnam came to seize forces, to build up its own forces and to grasp our party as a whole. There were lots of difficulties. We had to fight the US-Thieu forces sent to help Lon Nol, while at the same time they tried to stab us in the back. Our party, of course, decided to resolve the principal contradiction first that is, to win victory over Lon Nol.

The contradiction between us and Vietnam deepened towards 1973 when Vietnam united with the US at the negotiating table. The US immediately imposed conditions, obliging Vietnam to pressure Kampuchea to come to the negotiating table. They tried but we refused. The Vietnamese then made every effort to undermine our revolution. Meanwhile, as Vietnam and Laos laid down their arms, the US mobilized all its forces to bomb Kampuchea ? all its forces in South-East Asia! ? for 200 days and 200 nights, to force us to the negotiating table. Our party was resolutely opposed to kneeling to the US. Had we done so the Lon Nol traitors in Phnom Penh would have gained time to build up their forces. We decided to struggle to the end. We were in any case able to resist the US air war, and by defeating the US air war confidence grew in our party line. More and more people were convinced that our line was correct I must make clear that awareness of the party line did not come overnight or through theoretical studies. It grew as a result of the concrete experiences and suffering of the people and as a result of class hatred. It was only through practice that understanding of the party line deepened.

In 1974, the year after the air war, our party decided to launch the final big offensive, to liberate Phnom Penh and the whole country in the dry season of 1975. Vietnam was naturally informed. The Vietnamese believed the US would not allow us to win. Moreover they were not prepared to allow us to have victory in advance of their victory. Consequently, they refused to transport ammunition being sent from China and other countries, but especially from China. We had to use ammunition captured from the enemy; we received nothing from Vietnam. The Vietnamese opposed our winning because they wanted to liberate Saigon and then send their forces to liberate Phnom Penh, to build up a political apparatus here and to create a new party, thereby eliminating the Communist Party of Kampuchea and establishing an Indochinese Federation.

In spite of these difficult conditions, our party did its best and liberated Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975, two weeks in advance of the liberation of Saigon. Once we had liberated the whole country and secured our independence and sovereignty, that is in June 1975, the Vietnamese sent their troops to occupy our island, Koh Way. We defended it and forced Vietnam to withdraw. What we want to make clear to you is that, throughout the period of national democratic revolution, there was a hard, complicated struggle involving difficulties with the Soviet Union and Vietnam but we overcame these and won victory.

Question: At the time of the founding of the Communist Party, was there any discussion of the political line for the period leading to communism?

It is written in our party programme that we shall continue our socialist revolution and advance towards communism after the national democratic revolution, but we did not go into details. We worked out our present tasks of socialist construction after liberation.⁴

Our main tasks are to defend our state power and to continue the socialist revolution and socialist construction. We have defended our territory and sovereignty since liberation in a fierce, complicated struggle, especially against Vietnam. We think this struggle will last a long time since Vietnam has enormous ambitions. It wants to force Kampuchea into an Indochinese Federation and will pursue expansionist aims in all of South-east Asia.

As for living conditions, we have basically solved our problems by means of irrigation projects. We are accumulating capital for the development of our country on the basis of independence and self-reliance.

III. On Building the Party Ideologically

Having the right political line was not enough to ensure victory. Our party had to have, in addition, a firm revolutionary standpoint. This is partly because so much of our struggle was illegal. Thus, sometimes, if our cadres were not ideologically committed, they would surrender to the enemy or, once captured, they would tell secrets. To avoid this, we stressed ideological education.

During the struggle, we encountered many difficulties. For example, cadres separated from their families and not ideologically firm would sometimes decide to run back to their families and away from the revolution. And sometimes cadres were working underground within the enemy administration and receiving very high wages. Lacking a firm revolutionary standpoint, they would be bought. Thus our party could see that ideology was the key factor in implementing the political line as well as the organizational line. Ideological party building was done in two ways: by destroying incorrect ideological standpoints and by building up the correct ideological standpoints of the party. For example, we had to:

- (1) build up the ideological standpoint of the basic class in the party, the working class consciousness. To do this we had to define the different classes in our society and the contradictions between them. From this base, we armed our cadres ideologically with the viewpoints of the working class. This was done by explaining the spirit of sacrifice for the good of all and the need to abandon private ownership in favour of collective ownership; and by teaching them party discipline, love of party work, methods of self-criticism and ways to unite closely with the masses;
- (2) build up the ideological standpoint of revolutionary patriotism and revolutionary internationalism, the first being the fundamental standpoint. By this we mean striving energetically to make our own revolution, struggling successfully against imperialism and revisionism in our own country. This advances and supports the international struggle. To speak only of internationalism while failing to carry out the revolution in one's own country is meaningless. We have to be concrete in this. We try to teach our

people the principle of self-reliance in order to avoid making ourselves a burden for friendly countries. While they might like to help us, they must make their own revolutions and improve the living standard of their own people. Thus, we try as much as possible to avoid outside aid, to overcome all forms of suffering without seeking aid unless it is absolutely necessary. On the one hand, we try to avoid being too nationalistic, and on the other, to avoid being too internationalist;

- (3) build up the ideological standpoint of constantly maintaining revolutionary ardour, especially the desire to be like ordinary people, especially the poor peasants. This is why our party cadres and our men and women in the army do not receive wages; they are told to serve the party and to receive only from the party. In this way, we avoid creating a new ruling class separated from the people;
- (4) build up the concept of the mass outlook and of the mass line, that is, to have full confidence in the masses and to live among the masses, especially the poor peasants. Only by doing this can the revolution win victory and build its forces. We stress this to cadres because there are some who have petty bourgeois class backgrounds, specifically intellectuals who lack real confidence in the masses, especially in the poor peasants. We try to make them understand that these poor people can do everything. They conquered the enemy, do productive work and everything. Because they do everything, we must serve them;
- (5) Cadres are also instructed in revolutionary vigilance, that is, taking care to be on guard against the enemy;
- (6) We arm them with an understanding of dialectical materialism to enable them to analyse things and to understand the ideological standpoints of the party.

All of these ideological standpoints have been propagated in the branches and cells of the party. This was done not by the reading out of documents but by analysing daily activities, determining what was done wrongly and correcting shortcomings.

As for our books, they are only a few pages in length, as brief documents are more suitable for poor peasants. We also have some courses, mostly short ones for small groups -in underground work for two to three people-once or twice a month. There are also other courses held about twice a year in which party members are introduced to revolutionary concepts and educated in our political, ideological and organizational line.

Even now, after liberation, we believe the ideological factor is the determining factor. In cadre education, we place stress on destroying old society ideological standpoints which remain powerful. Among leading cadres, we also stress the defending and building up of working class consciousness. This is to avoid revisionism. When a party becomes revisionist, it is not because the ordinary member becomes revisionist but because the leadership leads the party towards revisionism. Although we say very little about revisionism outside the party, inside the party we have fought a lot against revisionism. It is partly for this reason

that we avoid using the documents of others. We rely mostly on our own assessments of class struggle. This is more concrete. Some of our cadres who have lived overseas, and who worked with foreign communist parties, regularly request foreign documents, claiming we neglect the study of Marxism-Leninism. But we tell them that Marxism-Leninism develops by means of the struggle of the people; our experiences are genuine Marxist-Leninist documents.

IV. The Organizational Line of the Party

We build the party ideologically and organizationally by relying on our class analysis, taking the poor peasant and worker classes as the basic classes. Those who joined from the petty bourgeoisie or other classes tried to promote the standpoints of those classes, but they had to renounce their old standpoints and develop working class consciousness. Cadres are evaluated on the basis of their concrete activities. Their spirit has to be clean uncorrupted and without entangling contacts with the enemy. We investigate life histories and class background both before and after they join the revolution. We do this to prevent infiltration by, for example, CIA, KGB or Vietnamese agents. By adopting these organizational principles, we have unity in the party and can cleanse our party of bad elements.⁵ We have not been 100 per cent successful. The enemy is still attempting to undermine the party. Consequently, we are striving to strengthen political and ideological education and to clean the party.

In summation, we can say that our party is integrated and united through this political, ideological, and organizational work. It has become stronger and stronger. We have learned that, as soon as you have a strong and clean party, you will have a strong revolutionary movement. We still have some distance to travel on this path, and the enemy, both the imperialists and the revisionists as well as the Vietnamese, continue to fight us. Thus, the building of the party continues from one generation to the next. We hope to avoid the possibility of the next generation becoming revisionist. If we can guard safely the interests of our country, we will also contribute to the struggle in the whole world. We know about the emergence of revisionism in the Soviet Union and we are saddened by this. And about the destruction of the Indonesian party by the enemy. We have learned from these experiences, and the experiences of other parties. We have tried not to fall by the wayside.

Question: Is there a danger ? from outside the country or inside the party ? a danger of a new class being created?

To clarify the nature of the struggle inside the party, yes, there are both dangers. Inside the party, there is a contradiction between the standpoints of private ownership and collective ownership. If we do not take care, it may become antagonistic. The other contradiction is external. Vietnam, in particular, is trying to undermine our party by military, political, economic and ideological means. The Vietnamese also try to infiltrate our party. We are not worried about the external, military aggression. We worry most of all about the enemy inside.

Question: Why is illegal work still the fundamental or basic work?

In this period, after liberation, it is *secret* work that is fundamental. We no longer use the terms 'legal' and 'illegal'; we use the terms 'secret' and 'open'. Secret work is fundamental in all that we do. For example, the elections of comrades to leading work are secret. The places where our leaders live are secret. We keep meeting times and places secret, and so on. On the one hand, this is a matter of general principle, and on the other, it is a way to defend ourselves from the danger of enemy infiltration. As long as there is class struggle or imperialism, secret work will remain fundamental. Only through secrecy can we be masters of the situation and win victory over the enemy who cannot find out who is who.

This also applies to foreign affairs. For example, the Soviet Union asked to come to Phnom Penh at liberation. They were preparing to send men to the Embassy. We said we could not possibly receive them and they were furious. We base everything on secrecy. This is in the interests of the working classes.

Question: Why do you not mention the Soviets externally?

Inside the party we struggle resolutely against the Soviet Union, but we have many enemies now ? US imperialism, Thailand, Vietnam ? and for tactical reasons we must limit our enemies as much as possible. It should be clear that we oppose the Soviet Union and revisionism, but our line has to be different from the line taken in China because we are a small country.

Take another example: our attitude towards 'the three worlds'. We have the same standpoint, exactly the same, but as for what we do, we have to bear in mind the concrete interests of our country.

Question: Do you have a party programme?

Yes we have one but only in Kampuchean. We still have many tasks; we have not done enough propaganda work internationally. The Vietnamese enemy has been able to make so much international propaganda against us because of shortcomings in our propaganda work in the international arena.

V. On Concrete Work Before and After Liberation

Before liberation, legal activities concerned work undertaken by different organizations such as the students' union, workers' associations, women's association and other organizations. We did everything we were allowed to do under the enemy's laws. There are also sub-categories of non-legal or non-open activities: semi-open and semi-secret forms or semi-legal and semi-illegal forms. Celebrating May 1st, for example, was both legal and illegal. Even though the ruling class might have caught us, we celebrated May 1st. We maintained the tradition once it was established. Perhaps it is different in your place.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea has never before been legal. This is also true of other progressive organizations we created. We developed the tactic of secrecy, firstly, to defend ourselves, secondly, to mobilize more forces, and finally to serve our struggle, for example, in mobilizing intellectuals. We found they would not join us if we used semi-illegal forms, but with legal forms such as celebrations and visiting temples, they joined in. Thus, we made them join us step-by-step. Many semi-secret and semi-illegal and secret activities were organized so as to protect the wholly illegal and secret activities of the party centre. Thus, when the enemy attacked from outside, he struck semi-illegal and semi-secret activities only and we were able to defend our party and its leadership. In the neo-colonial, semi-feudal society, we had to work in complete secrecy, both inside the party and inside other organizations. This also applied to party members working among the masses. Since liberation, we continue secret work because we consider the strategic line to be more important than tactics. We have published the names of only a few of our cadres and members. Not many need to be public. During the war, all of them were secret in this area, we learned from the bloodstained experience of the Communist party of Indonesia.⁶

Operating secretly, our organization has the following rules. Three members are required to form a cell, for example in a factory. If there are more than three members, a cell secretary must direct party work. If there are up to six people, we form two separate cells having no contact with each other. Even with five people we organize two separate party cells, which work secretly and separately. If the enemy discovers one cell, the other can continue its work. There are no direct contacts among cells. In each factory, there is one leading cadre. Only he knows this. He can go directly to the leadership. These procedures also apply to other sectors such as students. We form cells having no knowledge of each other and which are unable to contact each other. The same applies to contacts between the designated leading cadre and the leadership. Contacts are arranged through a third person. If the enemy captures the leading cadre, he will not be able to identify the leadership, only the go-between. This is our secret organization.

From our experience, secrecy is only one aspect of building up the organization. Of greater importance is the ideological level of the designated leading cadres. They must display great discipline. We had to be especially careful when work had to be done in the cities. Cadres can be forced to leave in a hurry. They should not live with their families. When they do, things get complicated. It takes them longer to escape. We have had some bitter experience with these things. Afterwards, we decided to observe party discipline more strictly. Permit me to say that we are speaking of concrete experiences and conditions in our country. It is up to you to decide what you can learn from these experiences. We offer these examples out of friendly revolutionary feelings.

Secrecy meant avoiding the law. For example, we had to make our own identity cards so that our names would not appear in the register. If the enemy captured genuine identity cards, photos and work permits, it would have been easier to find us. Also, if revolutionaries did not have any work, the enemy might have noticed us. We opened a bookshop for ourselves,

but to avoid letting out any of our names, we took shelter behind a third person and his name. During the war many cadres had to leave their jobs periodically, and we had to protect them. Contacts and meetings were at night; so were political training classes. We locked ourselves up in a room for two or three days until we were finished. Contacts between publicly well-known leaders, such as those who worked in parliament, and secret leaders were arranged through two or three other persons. We employed various tactics to overcome the oppression of the enemy. For meetings in a house, for example, we used signals, such as a scarf in front of the house. If the scarf was in place, it was safe to enter it; if it was not, the enemy was there. In the beginning we lost many people because the enemy knew the secret signals. From this we learned not to go directly into the house but to walk around the neighbourhood, maybe go into a shop, drink something and ask about what was happening in the house. Sometimes good people would tell us in confidence about the enemy. Sometimes the neighbours were not revolutionaries, but they would warn us if spies and agents were there.

We also used couriers for messages, letters, carrying ammunition, etc. Couriers were not allowed to know our real places of residence. Otherwise, captured couriers could be forced to reveal them. We had to use a bridge of two or three other persons. If a messenger failed to show up, we did nothing for two to three days. But after this, we had to move elsewhere. When the enemy learned this, they tortured captured couriers right away so as to catch us. From bitter experience, we learned to abandon a safe house at once if a messenger was two to three hours late. The enemy came immediately a few times and we had to use arms in order to allow leading cadres to escape. This should give you an idea of our experiences. The tactics and techniques are of secondary importance only; most important is the class standpoint of cadres.

Since liberation, our experience relates to anti-party activities organized inside our party. They usually involve CIA, Vietnamese and KGB agents. Our experiences in this area are very recent, but it appears from what we have been able to learn that CIA, Vietnamese and KGB agents have been working inside the party for a long time. When we observed that something was wrong, we thought it was an internal contradiction and attempted to resolve it by means of persuasion, self-criticism and so on. For example, the party had to give directives to a branch concerning the living conditions of the people. When nothing changed, we realized something was wrong. Where there were deviations to the left or to the right, we looked carefully into the backgrounds of the cadres. We also sought the opinion of the masses. We have thus been able to uncover enemy agents step-by-step. Generally, we discovered they had been engaged in enemy activities for a very long time. Sometimes good comrades had been imprisoned and tortured and afterwards they surrendered to the enemy. Upon release, they served as agents. We welcomed them back, accepted them, without looking at what had happened in prison. We now realize they had become agents of the enemy.

It is more widely known that the USA planned to seize power from us six months after liberation. The plan involved joint action on the part of the USA, the KGB and Vietnam. There was to be combined struggle from inside and outside. But we smashed the plan. Immediately after liberation, we evacuated the cities. The CIA, KGB and Vietnamese agents there left for the countryside and were unable to implement the plan. People who had infiltrated the party could not react immediately, but we discovered them later when they planned *coups d'état*. Their activities were coordinated with aggression from outside. These were not powerful people; their intention was to exploit the opportunity provided by Vietnam's attacks to assassinate our leaders and then announce it to the world. However, when the Vietnamese attacked, our army defeated them and we caught the traitors inside the party.

Although we say plans have been crushed, we do not mean the enemy has given up. We have to continue to build and to defend our party, and our leadership, and to apprehend the people who have infiltrated our party. We know the current plan involves not only Vietnamese agents, but has something to do with US imperialism and the KGB. All of them! A similar thing has occurred in Yemen, both North and South. **And in Afghanistan.** But as these things happen, the face of the Soviets becomes more and more clear.

Question: Is it co-operation between the CIA and KGB or is it rivalry for control of Kampuchea?

Both. On the one hand they co-operate; on the other, they are rivals. For example, Vietnam attacked us last October to December while the US conducted operations near our coastal islands and along the border with Thailand with its CIA agents. They compete for control at the same time. This is an open form of co-operation. As for the secret one, some CIA agents joined up with the Vietnamese in order to come to Kampuchea. Because the US was unable to come into Kampuchea, it had to rely upon Vietnam. The Vietnamese do not discriminate in choosing agents. They accept anybody who fights the Communist party of Kampuchea. Even CIA agents!

The leadership apparatus must be defended at any price. If we lose members but retain the leadership, we can continue to win victories. Defending the leadership of the party is strategic. As long as the leadership is there, the party will not die. There can be no comparison between losing two to three leading cadres and 200-300 members. Rather the latter than the former. Otherwise the party has no head and cannot lead the struggle. This has been demonstrated by the experience of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Its leadership was 90 per cent destroyed. It has taken them a very long time to re-establish themselves. Thirteen years have passed since 1965 and the party is not yet rebuilt. We do not know how long it will take for them to regain the offensive strength, which they had before. To build a good leadership is strategic. It takes 10-20 years to build up a good leading communist. If you lose one, you lose a lot. And party secrecy can be lost.

VI. Building and Leading the Revolutionary Movement

As we have said, from 1960 we regarded the workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and progressive patriotic personalities as strategic forces. The working class is the progressive class while the largest class is the peasantry. The others are secondary, allied forces. The national progressive capitalists were secondary, tactical forces mobilized in particular instances. The next step was setting the strategic line. The rural struggle was the fundamental struggle. We divided our cadres between the towns and the countryside, according to their abilities. Before 1960 there was some confusion about this. We did not have a clear party line. We had developed bases in the countryside but the enemy had destroyed up to 90 per cent of them. Moreover, we were not strong in the cities. We realized in 1959 that we lacked the strategic forces necessary for advancing the revolution!

It was only after 1960 that we could allocate our forces correctly. Most of them went to work among the peasants; slightly fewer worked among the petty Bourgeoisie, the students and intellectuals; a very few worked among national capitalists and with high-ranking personalities in the administration. Once we had this line we could very quickly build our forces. In particular, we built up rural base areas. As the mass movement became stronger and stronger, we were able to build up legal and illegal work. We could even mount mass demonstrations. From 1962 to 1963, in particular, our forces grew stronger and stronger.⁸

The best of our cadres worked among poor peasants building base areas in the most remote regions. They had to transform themselves so as to work among peasants. Initially, there were a lot of problems. Meanwhile in the cities, cadres had to become workers. The conditions in the cities and the countryside were quite different in rural areas, living conditions were very bad but there were few enemies. In the cities, living conditions were better but there were many enemies. Both places had advantages and disadvantages. Cadres had to be selected accordingly. There was a lot of malaria in the countryside. Some cadres refused to work there, but we had work to do and we had to strengthen their ideological standpoint.

When we look back upon this period, we realize we would not have obtained such a big victory without first overcoming such obstacles. We see two main turning points: if we had not reorganized in 1960, we could not have launched the armed struggle in 1968; if we had not launched the armed struggle in 1968, we would not have been masters of the situation at the time of the 1970 *coup d'état*. The enemy might otherwise have destroyed our forces. To be master of the situation, to rely upon your own forces, to be sovereign ? these words have meaning only if we have the forces of the people in our hands. If we do not, they will fall into the hands of the enemy. The most important thing was to grasp the national forces in our country. This was for us a major lesson.

We seek to stress the right thing in gathering forces. This is important in all periods of the revolution. Today, in the period of socialist revolution, our strength is greater than it was during the national democratic revolution. Take, for example, the petty capitalists who were

evacuated from the cities. Initially they had difficulties living in the countryside, but gradually they have become proud of the revolution. They see the prospects for their children, that our revolution is clean and that we are independent and sovereign. They know we can defend ourselves from Vietnam, and they have confidence in us. As for the intellectuals who have remained abroad, some support us. In France, an association has expressed solidarity with us against Vietnam. We are stronger now than in the first revolution: 85 per cent of the population belongs to the revolution, as workers and peasants, and 80-90 per cent of the intellectuals belong to it. Only ten per cent are different. We try to educate these people so that they will see that the revolution is good for them and their children. Thus we grow stronger and stronger.

We have gathered forces from different strata in different periods because everyone recognizes the patriotic spirit of the communists. The feudalists said bad things about Vietnam and the USA without doing anything. They were corrupt and let Vietnam come ? 100 kilometres, 200 kilometres, half a kilometre ? across the border by corrupting the police.

The Vietnamese thus crawled into our country by what they term 'legal' means, especially in Takeo and Svay Rieng. But when power came into the hands of the party, everyone saw that we could hold aloft the banner of independence. They realized communists were clean, that we live as ordinary people live, while in the old days, when people lived in a capitalist way, the society disintegrated. As soon as people understood, they followed the communist way and we could easily mobilize forces.

VII. Forming the National United Front

How did we make Sihanouk join us? We were able to mobilize forces after the *coup d'état* because we had made preparations for a long time. We were masters of the situation. We had an army; we had some weapons. Thus, we were able to form a united front. We even allowed King Sihanouk to become chairman of the front. It meant nothing because *we* were the masters of the situation. Following the coup, Sihanouk was reduced from everything to nothing while for us it was the opposite ? in the cities as well as in the countryside. Forces from the basic levels of society were essential for getting top levels to join us. That is the first lesson.

The second lesson and experience concerns front activities. We did not have an easy time of it. The enemy tried to corrupt Sihanouk ? the USA, the French, the Soviet revisionists ? and to split him away from the front. Sihanouk did not leave because we won victory after victory at the basic level. Sihanouk would have left us had we not done so, especially in 1973 when Vietnam sat at the negotiating table with the USA. Sihanouk was scared to be alone; he kept asking if we were able to continue the struggle. He wanted to negotiate but we told him we would continue the struggle to the end.

Thirdly, we found we had to struggle inside the front with Sihanouk at the same time that we united with him externally. Sihanouk asked for things; we let him have them as long as this did not contradict our strategic policy. We had to be very flexible towards him. The party slogan was 'Don't push anybody over to the enemy'.

VIII. The Urban Struggle, 1960-73

Our struggle in the cities had two components: the legal struggle and the secret struggle. The urban struggle was not as important as the struggle in the countryside but its impact was felt all over the country and on an international level. Moreover, the struggle had an important effect on the middle level of the ruling class, in spite of the fact that the city was the headquarters of the ruling class and its apparatus of oppression.

Some of the legal work was undertaken in the National Assembly. We did not attempt to obtain seats; we used patriotic personalities for making propaganda. These dignitaries did not act in the name of the party, but the party was in essence behind the propaganda. The work was limited. We just let our people use strategic slogans to arouse the people. At the same time, we used newspapers, promoted rumours and asked people to follow the deputies whom we had managed to get into the Assembly. In this way, we worked at the top, making people follow us while at the same time we worked at basic levels.

Although we were able to work legally in the National Assembly, our deputies were sometimes subject to repression. We would then try to sneak our ideas into other deputies by telling them, 'If you say this and this, people will follow you and elect you again'. And sometimes they tried it. When our slogans were used before the people, the people applauded. The deputies were pleased. Later they would ask us what to say and we would then sneak more of our slogans into them. Some of our comrades could not understand this and thought that by doing this we might strengthen the influence of the ruling class. But we did not think it did any harm. If we could get some of the essence of our ideas to the people, then we could get some of these people with us. There were difficulties in the struggle with our newspapers.

When the ruling class realized a particular newspaper had been secretly established by the party, it would be closed in less than three months. We would then let comrades write anonymously for newspapers of a more neutral nature. Sometimes the paper would cut out half the words. We did it nonetheless; to get some ideas out. We also let our people respond to reactionary newspaper articles, by writing letters to the editor asking the paper to stop printing reactionary views. In the case of the most reactionary papers, those that could not be restrained in any other way, we called for mass demonstrations at their offices. In the case of *Phnom Penh Presse*, a CIA newspaper and the most reactionary of them all, we let the people sack the place.⁹ Among our other activities in the cities, we promoted artistic performances among the people and arranged travel to rural areas for festivals, ceremonies, and so on. We were thus able to make our forces stronger and stronger at all levels of the society.

Choosing the right slogan, the slogan that suited the situation ? asking not too much, not too little in the situation ? was crucial to our work in the cities. We did not use words like

'revolutionary', 'communist', or 'red', for example. Instead we used words everyone would accept such as 'Fight US Imperialism', 'Fight for Sovereignty', etc. People were especially scared of words such as 'communist' and 'revolutionary'. But we made them adopt our party line, in its essence, by putting out the party line. If in this way we could make people adopt the line ? people who were otherwise afraid of 'revolution' and 'communism' ? then those people, in spite of their fears, were able to hold aloft our party flag.

We even worked within the movement of Buddhist monks, making them follow us by saying we would defend the country and religion. If the country were to become dominated by foreigners, there would no longer be any religion. So monks, too, held aloft our banner even if they did not like communism. We worked not only among the rank-and-file monks ? they were not so reactionary, in any case ? but also among high-ranking monks who controlled large parts of the country. We used slogans opposing foreign suppression of the culture of Kampuchea. Monks then became patriotic, supporting us without being aware of it.

We also worked with high personalities such as Penn Nouth.¹⁰ Here, we had to be careful. We had to solicit his ideas, not make propositions, not propagate. The high-ranking patriotic personalities were not an important force but we were trying to gather all forces in support of the struggle, especially in the cities. We asked, for example, 'What would your Excellency think if the USA attacked the country?' He would then think about it and we would sneak in ideas about what had to be done. The dignitaries then listened to us and spoke to others under their influence. Thus Penn Nouth did not know that he propagated for the communists.

These were the different forms of legal struggle in the cities. However, we put most stress upon the secret struggle. Without the secret struggle, the legal struggle would not have succeeded. These two forms of struggle interacted and complemented each other, but the secret work was the most important.

We had to educate our cadres all the time about secret as well as legal work. When the situation was easy, cadres wanted to work legally so as to have the chance to gain a title, money, etc. And when the situation was difficult, they preferred instead to work secretly. Consequently they had to be educated continuously, so as to be able to remain firm at their posts even at the risk of their lives. They could not assume new duties on their own, before the party gave authorization. This was ideological work.

Anticipating difficulties, we took precautions. We set up bases in the countryside that would receive people engaged in secret work in the cities. Once secrecy was broken, however, those comrades were not allowed into secret work in the countryside. Once out in the open ? always open work. We had to be careful about where people went so that no one knew in advance. If they did, the enemy could find out.

When cadres had trouble, they often asked to be sent to the countryside even when secrecy remained unbroken. Because of this we had to work step-by-step with their ideological standpoint, and we had to keep an eye on those working in the cities ? either secretly or legally ? observing especially their living conditions and personal circumstances. Those working secretly could not hold jobs as ordinary people did, so we had to assist them in finding jobs to some extent.

In accordance with the party's correct line, we were able to build and to defend our forces. Some were destroyed by the enemy, but for the most part we were able to protect them; especially after the coup in 1970 when we had large liberated areas. The locations of our most important bases were a secret. Even US electronics could not discover them. Although US bombings destroyed a lot, they were not very effective because we stuck to our secret line of struggle. Vietnamese forces in Vietnam were less well-hidden and less secret than we were and because of that more of them were destroyed. Even the Vietnamese here were hit more often than we were.

Our people and soldiers called the B-52s 'the blind ones'. When they came, they dropped bombs without looking. They did not care whether they hit anything or not. Our people were not too afraid of the B-52s.

We learned that as long as we preserved our secrecy, our struggle could continue as long as necessary. Even US-made artillery was ineffective when it was not known who or where we were. Within limits. Some of us were hit But we told our cadres not to be afraid, to keep themselves well hidden and then we would all be able to throw out the US imperialists.

[Nuon Chea concluded his statement at this point as the time allocated for the meeting had elapsed.]

“Security Circular”

**Office S-21
(Democratic Kampuchea)
Phnom Penh**

Circular

Please all comrades stick to this circular firmly [absolutely].

I. Guarding [Enemy] Regulation

1. While guarding the prison, do not sit, lie against the wall or write anything. Walk back and forth.
2. Do not ask the prisoners their names.
3. Do not walk away from the spot assigned. Do not enter the cells or open the doors or windows to peer at the prisoners inside.
4. Do not question any prisoner inside the cells, even if you know who they are.
5. Do not threaten or beat prisoners. If the prisoners disobey the rules or ignore warnings, report to your supervisor in writing or by mouth.
6. If the prisoners try to break the lock, hang themselves, cut their wrists, or attempt to swallow screws, shackle their hands behind them and report immediately to your supervisor - do not delay.
7. If a prisoner manages to escape, inform the supervisor at once and assign soldiers to bring them back, do not claim that there are no soldiers.
8. When patrolling, comrade-members of the group and fifty-member units must be present at the assigned locations.

9. Do not sleep or sit against the wall. Walk back and forth constantly.
10. Cadres and youths have to inspect thoroughly at all four designated times. In other words, four inspections are to be conducted in twenty-four hours; at 6 a.m., 11 a.m., 6 p.m., and 11 p.m.
11. When checking prisoners, undress them and let them dress themselves up before leaving the rooms.
12. Prisoners are not allowed to take off their clothes. If they do, punish them by taking away all of their clothes.
13. During patrol, cadres must carefully keep the keys on their person. No keys may be lost. If they are lost, do not cut the lock, but look for them until they are found. If a prisoner escapes from a room where a key has been lost, comrades who held the key will take all responsibility in front of the collective.
14. Guards must wear military uniform on duty, do not wear short pants.

II. Lock and Shackles

1. Before locking the cells, check the lock, shackle rings and shackle bars thoroughly and then unlock hand shackles and untie the eyes of the prisoner.
2. Remaining shackle rings and bars have to be removed from the cells.
3. Shackle a hand to a leg and stay close to the prisoner when they dispose of their feces. Do not stay away from him.
4. Check the prisoners' bodies when they return from the interrogation room.
5. The length of the chain must be no longer than a half-meter; in any other case inquire of the supervisor.

III. Measures

1. Prisoners in houses are not allowed to talk to each other.
2. Prisoners in our prisons are not permitted to talk to each other either.

3. Those who guard inside the buildings are not permitted to come outside, for the reason that the prisoners might do something bad and not be noticed.
4. Each house has its own list of prisoners and their room numbers.
5. For the guns, no bullets are loaded in the magazines attached to the gun, only those worn on the body.
6. Those who guard inside are not allowed to be armed with guns, only sticks.
7. Each gun has its owner.
8. Do not leave the gun down anywhere - hold it.
9. Do keep the gun near the prisoner or carry it close to them.
10. Tasks should be set forth clearly during changing of the guard. Inform the new guards about the condition of the prisoners and other important details.
11. Disposal of feces and urine and checking the prisoners' bodies is done during the interval by the new guards. The previous guards are not allowed to go anywhere until the replacement guards have done this initial task.

Guarding Unit

1. Guard inside	127 persons
2. Medical staff	14 persons
3. List keeper and maker	2 persons
Total	143 persons

Economic (logistics) Unit

1. Economic (logistics) of the guarding unit 13 persons
2. Economic (logistics) of interrogation unit 6 persons
3. Economic (logistics) of the prisoners 7 persons

4. Collecting and cleaning feces containers 3 persons

5. Fishers 4 persons

6. Barbers 5 persons

7. Pig, chicken and duck feeders 8 persons

Total 46 persons

Messenger Unit

1. Guard inside special rooms 42 persons

2. Arresters 8 persons

3. Vehicle unit 10 persons

4. Medical staff 2 persons

Total 62 persons

15- and 16-Year-Old Youth

1. Medical training 17 persons

2. Remaining 59 persons

Total 76 persons

An Autobiography by the Khmer Rouge Ambassador to the UN

Khmer Rouge Ambassador to the UN 1975-1992

Translated by Phat Kosal and Sokha Irene

Our comrade in charge has reported that our class enemy has brought accusations on me. I would like to sincerely and wholeheartedly present my autobiography to the party as follows:

1. Family

Real name: Prasit

Revolutionary name: Sarn

Sex: Male, Nationality: Khmer

Marital Status: Married

My wife's name: Krushna Thourei, French nowadays living in France.

Children: 2 daughters and 1 son. My oldest daughter is 21 and now joined the revolution.

The other 2 still under the care of my wife.

Date of Birth: February 3, 1930, Phnom Penh.

- My grand father's name: Thiounn, feudal class and reactionary traitor serving the French colonist.

- My mother's name: Bun Chan Mouli, conservative and feudal class, still alive. Age: not known and perhaps over 70.

- My Sibblings: My elder sister:

- Thiounn Choeun, doctor and Minister of Health.

- Thiounn Cheoum married. Her husband's name Chhean Vorm, capitalist class. His political background is not known and I have not seen him for years.

- My elder brother: Thiounn Chum (Comprador) capitalist. His political background is not known and I have not seen him for years.

- My elder brother: Thiounn Mom joined the revolution since 1951 and is working in the Ministry of Industry.

I am the youngest one in the family.

II. From 1930 to 1949

From 1935 (or 1936!) to 1949:

I studied in Sisowath High School supervised by the French in Phnom Penh until Grade 6. Because I didn't do well in grade 6, the French principal decided to disconnect my studies there. My parent parents then decided to send me to Saigon to continue my studies at Chasseloup Labat High School.

From 1941 to 1945:

I continued my studies at Sisowath High School again until I graduated in July 1949. It was that time when the national patriotism idea developed in my mind. It was also the first time I had been in some contact with Cambodians. When I graduated in July 1949, the French colonist persuaded and indoctrinated me to serve them as my father and grandfather had done. To lure me, they granted me a tour trip coverage by sea to Manila City (the Philippines) and Hong Kong (July-August 1949).

III. From 1949 (September) to 1955 (December)

I continued my studied in France, in September 1949 when I obtained from the government half of a full scholarship for my studies until 1952 when the Royal Government cut off my scholarship, because I opposed them. My first intention was to study dentistry but I changed the major and undertook the study of medicine production and sales. After 2 years' study in this area, I again went on to undertake the major of transportation until late 1954. After my graduation, the Royal Government then assigned my to work in the railway station. I spent 6 months on an internship at a French railway station. Through the period of 6 years that I remained in France, I woke up to the consciousness of national patriotism against the French colonists. And I sought to bring about independence and a new era for Cambodia to become a socialist state.

In 1951, I joined the pro-Marxist and Leninist communique, which was founded in Paris by Comrade Brother Pol Pot, Brother Vann and Brother Khieu...etc. I was constantly and closely involved in all activities until 1955. In 1953, with advice from these brothers, I decided to enter into the French party. In 1953, with advice from these brothers, I decided to enter into the French party. In 1953, the French Security Police arrested me and detained me for one day to interrogate me about activities of the Khmer Student Association, which strongly opposed King Sihanouk, who betrayed the people. At that time, I had only national patriotism, not yet class consciousness. My national soul was not at its peak yet because of my confusion between national and international patriotism. Therefore, I got married to a French woman in December 1954. The reason for such a decision is attributive to the education I received from the exploiting French feudal and colonial class. My wrong decision has caused me frustration and feeling of regret up to now. During my study in France, I didn't have any other friends other than you all within the Marxist and Leninist party. I had only one French friend whom I developed closed relationship with. This friend was involved in some political activities within the French party before but withdrew himself from the party a long time ago. He is also a friend of Comrade Ros Chithor (dead). He is now doing his normal business. Whenever I meet him, he and I never talk about Cambodia and he rarely ask me either. He just wishes to live a life of comfort.

IV. From 1956 to 1963

This is the period of internal chaos.

- I returned to Cambodia in late December 1955. I worked in the Railway station. The party advised me to organise a railway station cell and that placed me in charge of educating the staff and workers there. Then I kept receiving a lot of advice from the party and I was appointed Party Secretary of the railway station cell to secretly educate workers and to write for "Observer Newspaper".

- From November 1958 to April 1959: At the request from the Ministry of Railways and with the authorisation of the party, I went to do a study tour in Japan. At that time, I was aware of the traitorous activities of the traitors, Sam Sary and Dap Chhuon. I also found out the espionage activities of a Japanese man named Tada Toma among Khmer students in Japan.

- After my return from Japan, I worked in the party railway cell until June 1961 when Sihanouk severely attacked me. The class enemy resorted to such attacks because the rebellious movement of the railway workers was growing greater and greater.

- The party had decided that I cut off relations with the party for a while (almost one year). The exploiting class administration transferred me to the Ministry of Public Works. In 1962, the party changed my function to undertake activities of the ruling class and foreigners. At that time, I became acquainted with a French colonel named Mare. Through this relationship, I received some information but later realised that he was a spy from the French Second Bureau (2B). However, it is owing to my keen observation that I did not break out our secrecy to him.

- In 1963, after the purge of 34 people, the party laid out a plan to send me to France for a while. At first, I was very worried because I did not know how to live in France. Because the situation was getting more and more tense, I requested that the party allow me to escape to France. The party then agreed. By that time, I saw an escape as a complicated matter for me. However, through my relevant educational background in France and through self-examination, I found out that the escape was suitable and would help alleviate the problems that existed in my life and for my entire family.

- In June 1963, after 2 months of persistent request for a visa from the administration of the exploiting class, I obtained a visa and departed to France along with my sister's daughter. My two children followed me in December 1963. I went to France via Prague as I wanted to take the opportunity to find out information about cities of the country widely known as a socialist state. I stayed in this city for 2 days waiting for a connecting flight to Paris.

- Over the past 7 and a half years, I have received a great deal of education from the party and have been involved in many activities against the Imperialist and ruling class. I have had a lot of experience with workers and intellectuals. Although the enemy actually investigated my activities and put pressure on me, I was still happy to struggle against them. However, at that time, I was very idealistic. I did not possess a clear-cut conception of class standpoint-still blurry. I still enjoyed life of the exploiting class.

In between 1958 and 1960, the event of revisionism appeared and I did not have a good view of that and clear standpoint toward that. For this reason, I just lived up to the party's advice which was that I had to put the national matters above anything else- Cambodia matter must be seen as a priority and to stage a Cambodian revolution taking the national interest as the most important of all.

V. From (June) 1963 to (March) 1970:

- When I arrived in France, I taught the Khmer students the internal situation within the party to spread out among Khmer students in France. I adhered to the standpoint to which the party had advised me to adhere and I was concerned with the conflict between the revisionist and Chinese the revisionist and our revolution. The party standpoint and concept helped solve to a greater extent the chaotic confusions within the mind of Khmer students in France.
- Within the period of almost seven years, my political activities were just within the circle of the Khmer Student Association and some other Cambodians. I have established tie with my old friends who studied with me. A Mare whom I met in Phnom Penh contacted me as well but not as often since he lived very far from us. After the March 1970 coup, it was obvious that he protected the traitor, Lon Nol. I then broke off relation with him in early 1971. I did not have any other contact with any other foreigners. Nor did I join any activities. I do not even know certain Vietnamese with whom our students had connection in Paris. I did not re-established relation with the French communist party. I did spend 90% of my time earning a living in order to feed my family and to care for my job.
- However, I was at that time very idealistic. I still lived the way of the exploiting class. In between 1958 and 1960 the event of revisionism appeared and I didn't have a good view of that clear standpoint. For this reason, I lived up to the party's advice which was that I had to put the national matter above anything else. The Cambodia's matters must be seen as a priority and to stage a Cambodian revolution taking the national interest as the most important of all.
- Eventually, I moved to live in France for a while just to await the day when the party called me to return. At the same time, I prepared to return to Cambodia, I joined the Khmer Student Association in France and tried to educate students there as much as I could. Over the past seven and a half years, I completely lost touch with the party.
- During my stay in France, I received some money from my mother. Especially in 1968 I received from my mother 50,000 Tranout.
- From 1963 to 1968, I worked in a fuel company (coal and oil). In 1960, I worked in a French Airport in Paris.
- During my stay in France, I was very much influenced by the French capitalists in terms of life style, concept and standpoint. Even though it was because I prepared and awaited the day I would undertake my assigned tasks and that I had keenly observed the internal situation, that revolutionary standpoint had faded to a great extent. My revolutionary standpoint looked blurry and step by step I came to care very much about seeking a comfortable life and I failed to educate people there to think about the national interest. I was blinded by material things and I didn't realise that this was the concept of revisionism until after I was educated after the coup. In fact, if there was not a coup and the party didn't call me to operate in Beijing after the coup, I would have been unable to correct and change myself and I would have lived in France and served the French capitalists forever. The party has put me on the right track and has washed me off

corruption and has educated me to become a man of grace. The way the party introduced to me was rather complicated but it is a clean way full of credit.

- Since I already prepared myself, and had hoped that one day the party would call me back and the party had demanded that I stay away from my family for a while, I made everything possible to enable my family to become independent and self-reliant in terms of earning a living and living in my absence. Therefore all the money deposited in the bank was in my wife's name or in both mine and hers. With a capitalist concept, I thought that I should buy a house and make payments by salary instalments (by on credit) because it gave me more benefit and was much cheaper than renting one. I did that in 1965, due to the distance of the house and the fact that I received some money from my mother and I could work in the French Airport in Praise, I decided to change my address by borrowing additional money from the French Air-line company before I sold my old house. All these activities showed that I was drowned in the capitalist society. This was required by the regulation of "the Paris Airline" that every one has to give 3-month notice if they want to quit their job. This prompted me to follow the party's advice which was to send me to Beijing. I see this as my main disadvantage and I have felt regretful up to this day.
- The situation of property ownership is as follows:
 - Housing: In 1970 I was allowed by a French notary to live in the house in Paris until he died. I would like to confirm that my wife and I saved money to buy this house. My wife shared 1/3 of the whole budget.
 - Account in the bank: Because the account in the bank was only eligible to my wife I really don't have any information concerning the account. I have my own account and I allowed my wife to use it. According to information from her 5 months ago, the account was valid for 2,700 « RteNat ». However, I really don't know how the money has been managed so far.

All these problems have sometimes caused me feelings of frustration. I haven't figured out a clear solution to them yet. To be eligible to sell the house, we must divorce. According to the French law, it will take a long time or it may even be impossible, unless both sides consent to the divorce. Practically, I had only 2 options-either to divorce my wife or to bring my family to live in Cambodia.

When certain front members handed over their houses back to the party in Paris, I was ashamed but did not know how to better approach the matter. Now I am still at an impasse.

My family: She worked in Khum Orsie. The khum chief is a communist. However, as I know she had tried to look for a job at 2 or 3 different places because she had experience at being an adviser to the Family Planning Consultancy. I did not know how much her salary was. As I presume she just got enough to cope with the family's needs. She joined the French party in 1970 but she did not get along very well with the French party. Generally, she is a woman who likes to see progress but has the idea of self-comfort. She is also uninterested in politics.

VI. From March 1970 to December 1975

During this period I actively served the revolution in the front line under the leadership of the party until I was able to return to the country. " I arrived in Cambodia in August but I stayed only 2 days."

I arrived in Beijing on July 8, 1970 via Moscow. At that time, most people did not like to travel by French planes because these planes flew via Thailand. Over the past 5 years I would like to present my activities, concepts, and standpoints toward certain issue as follows:

- Party tasks: I came to Beijing to implement the party's advice. Because I could not come to Beijing immediately due to certain reasons I mentioned above, I and our comrades in France decided to first send Comrade Thiounn Mom, my brother. Upon my arrival in Beijing, my primary target was to contact the party and to present my report to the party and to implement the party's advice. It was only in February 1971 that I had a chance to meet the party in Hanoi. In the early stage, due to the fact that I was for a long time disconnected from the party and deeply influenced by the French capitalist, my revolutionary standpoint was still weak. That was why I found it very difficult to implement the party line. Thanks to all constant advisory assistance from the party, I had successively renounced individual and personal ownership and I attached myself to the party and the revolution again. Subsequently, the party trusted me. It was all these factors that motivated me to successfully fulfil the tasks entrusted by the party. In addition, I had grasped hold of and understood the element of communism and built myself up to a greater extent. It was only after my involvement in the revolution that my life was meaningful and bright again.
- Front tasks: Just after my arrival in Beijing, Pen Nut and Sihanouk made me Minister responsible for internal correspondence. At the same time Comrade Keat Chhon was made Minister and Prime Minister's Assistant(?). I did not ask for this post; nor had I proposed I be placed in this place. Sihanouk and Pen Nut treated us this way because they wanted to gain more force. Besides, they did not investigate the internal correspondence of our party and they were not sure about my background. They just knew that I possessed the same position they did. At that time, I was not interested in high position. My biggest goal then was to get salary to support my family. Rank and reputation were not important to me at all.

The top Front members were not happy with this assignment. They accused me of being an enemy betraying their class, being against their class, blocking their process to grasp full power and preventing them from politically negotiating with the imperialist. They said I was French because my spouse was French. They accused me because I did not allow them to steal money. They said I was a revisionist, Yuon (Vietnamese) etc.

Besides, I also had some weak points:

1. I could not understand clearly about the political line of the Front and the activities of the party.

I still had a French attitude. I am not gentle. I sent my family money. All of these due to my ex-class, as oppressor. In fact, the class struggle in the high rank Front is very strict. The oppressors attacked the party through me because while I had the internal contact I was always afraid that people would not like me or would know about my weak points.

3. With the Vietnamese:

In late July 1970, I went to Hanoi with Chan Seng as the Vietnamese government had invited us. Before boarding, I was told by a Chinese comrade that someone wanted to see me. It was Vort Samoeun. He was going to fly to Hanoi as well. He told me to keep prudent with Chao Seng and to make sure that he had no reason to suspect me. Comrade Vort Samoeun sat in the captain's room. I asked him if our party policy accorded with the Vietnamese's. He told me that we had mutual trust with the Vietnamese.

Upon my arrival in Hanoi, I again met him in secret and I asked the Vietnamese for a loan to sponsor the Cambodian Student Association in France and to pay back the loan on my house in Paris as well. I really regretted it. Whenever I think of it, I am always angry with myself and feel much pain. I made such mistakes because I did not have national pride and I lacked political experience and I wrongly believed in the standpoint of internationalism. I can not forget this event.

In the first 9 years I misunderstood a lot about the Vietnamese. I mistakenly thought the Vietnamese were loyal and respected us. According to this misunderstanding, I reported openly through the Vietnamese about our internal situation. That is why the Vietnamese knew all our weak points. On February 1971 I met the party again in Hanoi.

The Vietnamese were trying to lure me to work for them because they knew about my weak points-- I used to live in France; my grandfather is Vietnamese and a revisionist like him.

I did not know about the Vietnamese nature until I joined the Front. I thought that the Vietnamese were good revolutionary people. That was a great regret I had while I was working with the Front. Constant education from the party and practical experience on the international arena portrayed to me the tricky mind of the Vietnamese and I saw this as the danger to our revolution and nation. Their new and recent attempt to obliterate our party leadership machine and to destroy our growing revolution reassure me of the life-and -death antagonism between our party and Vietnam. Vietnam never gave up its attempt to swallow our territory. Its new congress reiterated an obvious land-swallowing ambition.

From 1970 to 1971, at an international conference, there was some bilateral cooperation between the two countries but from 1972, our delegation was independent even though the conference was about the three countries.

4. With the Russian

1. I first met the Russian revisionist while I transited in Moscow to continue another flight to Beijing. When I arrived in Moscow, Chea San, our Front Ambassador took me to meet the leader of a mass organization named Russian Liberty Organization, Chan Seng and Chea San explained and thanked them.

2. In September 1970, the Front government assigned me to participate in the meeting in Berlin, East Germany and the meeting of the Executive Committee of Stockholm on Vietnam in order to explain the recent situation in Cambodia, and reply to the invitation. There I met the Russian because the organisation was led by the revisionist. They did not say anything but spied on us.

3. In October, 1970, the Front Government assigned me to participate in a conference which focused on "The investigation of the genocide commitment by America in Indochina". This conference was held in Stockholm, where I met the Russian but we did not have an opportunity to chat. They spied on me.

4. In November, 1970, the government assigned me to join the conference focusing on "Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia" in Stockholm. On my way via Moscow, I gave a marble sculpture to the Russian Liberty Organisation". In Stockholm, the Russian Ambassador invited the Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian delegations to join a party at the Russian Embassy. The Cambodian delegations comprised Touch Rinn (the traitor), Krin Leang and me. At the banquet I thanked the Russian Embassy for their support. On my return via Moscow, the Russian Liberty Organisation held a congress supporting the resistance movements of the Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian. I made a speech and thanked the Russian people for their support for our resistance.

5. While I was waiting in Moscow to attend the November 1970 conference in Paris, a Russian named Akova Longko, who was said to be a Central Committee member responsible for Asian Affairs came to meet me in my room at the hotel. "Russia was a great power nation but does not tend to oppress Cambodia", he said. He did not acknowledge Sihanouk. He would not acknowledge Sihanouk's government unless the Cambodian party asked for it. He wanted to meet the Cambodian party. If he could not, he wanted our letter asking his government to acknowledge our Front government.

This is the first time I met with the Russian. I told him that I did not know if there was any party in Cambodia but I would inform the leader.

I informed the party of every single thing that went on in that conversation after my arrival in Beijing in December.

I gave the fax to the Vietnamese after I had known that the party representatives had arrived in Hanoi. He/she read and then kept it. The next day they told me to give the fax to the party representative personally.

6. After having met the party and being re-educated by the party in February 1972, the party assigned me to participate in the Versailles International Conference for peace in Indochina. This conference focused on liberty in Indochina and was recognised by the revisionist. It was a mass organisation conference. There was an incident between the Russian and Cambodian delegation. The Russian did not agree to include all the Cambodian standpoints in the conference decision. After a long conversation held until 3 am., I told them that if they still did not put up all Cambodian standpoints for discussion at the conference, they should not include put any of them at all. In case they discussed about Cambodia and did not state the right point, I would make a protest in a high profile conference. The French

newspaper and overseas television forecast this argument. Finally, the Russian agreed. Our standpoint was to solve Cambodian problems on March 23, 1970 and asked them to acknowledge our Front government.

7. In May 1975, the organisation responsible for the conference in Stockholm on Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, invited the Cambodian delegation to talk about the Cambodian problem. The party assigned me to lead the delegation and ask for an international conference focusing on Cambodia issues. The Russian tried every measure possible to block the conference from being held. However, after the victory on August 15th 1973, they were obliged to support the conference to show that they supported the Cambodian people

8. The international conference on Cambodia was held in December 1973 in Paris. The party assigned me to lead the Cambodian delegation. This conference gave us a victory. The Russian became isolated. In my speech, I talked about the friendship between the citizens of both nations and the love for liberty and justice, especially among Cambodian, Vietnamese, Laotian, Chinese and Koreans. Two or three days later, the conference came to the end. Akova Longko, the one I met in Moscow in December 1970, asked to meet me again. I accepted the appointment. I had Front people to take part in the conversation in order to avoid talking about the correspondence within the parties. There was Ieng Kounsaky among us." You said about the friendship among the 5 countries. Does Cambodia want only these 5 friends? What about those who supported Cambodia? Aren't they Cambodian friends? If you still keep saying that, it will affect the relationship between Russia and Cambodia "said Akova Longko. It was a threat which interfered in our internal affairs and abused our sovereignty. "I mentioned about the friendship with the 5 countries because these countries have supported us since the beginning, especially China which supported us in every aspect without any condition. Moreover, that country has never interfered with our internal affairs as certain countries have done" I replied. akova Longko was very angry and got red in the face. Then he changed the subject to talked about the success of the conference. Before he said good-bye, he said, "he was very pleased to see me because we have gotten to know each other much better". I replied, "Yes, we have known each other more."

On my way back to Beijing via Moscow, the Russian Liberty Organisation men came to greet me at the airport. They invited me for a meal in the airport restaurant because I did not have much time in Moscow, I was only transiting. They gave me a warm welcome. They advised that Cambodia should write a book about the failure of the imperialist America's coup, for it is a surprise in world history.

It was the last time I talked with the Russian until I went to work at the United Nations office in 1975.

9. Among the revisionists, Cuba was a country which got involved the most with us because it was a revisionist country that had acknowledged us since the beginning. In every conference, its delegations behaved well and in a friendly way toward our delegations. It is just show but in fact, they made very short speeches all the time. I also contacted with them, especially Melba Enandes, the third or fourth woman in the resistance movement with Fedel Castro. A part from this, we did not have any special relationship at all. I think that the Russian and Cubans knew I was a party member because the Vietnamese had introduced me. This was one reason why they behaved in a friendly way towards me. Now they also

know about me. Therefore, this friendship was deteriorating while the party assigned me to lead the delegation to Cuba in May this year they did not give us a warm welcome as before.

10. My theory and standpoint toward Russia. IN 1970-71, I did not know what a revisionist was; nor did I know clearly about Russia. That was why I wanted the revisionist country to acknowledge our country by explaining to them. I thought they had revolutionary quality. It would be beneficial for our resistance movement if they acknowledged us.

The party re-education and the real experiment made me realise about the danger the revisionist may caused to our revolution. I have never bothered them, but I will never let hem influence our internal affairs or affect our sovereignty and integrity.

I still have the revisionist quality because I got the influence from the capitalist. That is why I always keep prudent whenever I am on mission abroad. Both the revisionist and imperialist America knew my background and never reconciled. They did not give up persuading me and it is good for me to return to Cambodia, far away from them. The imperialist is our life and death enemy. I taught the high-ranking Front both in theory and standpoint that this is the last war; so we must resist in order to fulfil all the five essences of the Front. In 1973, I believed that we can succeed without negotiation. The long time resistance did not give me much difficulty because I live abroad. Being apart from my family was the only problem I had. This long time resistance relied a lot on the international arena, I have never forgotten about the absolute resistance standpoint.

VII. Conclusion

During these 5 years, I have been very pleased to do my best serving the People Revolution Party. It is a very meaningful time in my life because I have participated in the international arena and served the party until we completely gained victory. I am very happy to live near the party again.

The influence I got from the French capitalist during my stay (1963-70) is an obstacle in the process of building up myself to reach my satisfaction. These obstacles include family and personal property.

In conclusion, I could understand the political line, the theory and the principal of the party. However, I could not understand clearly the intervention and the practice of the international political line. I recognised this lacking quality after my return in late 1975.

VIII. The year 1976

1. After our historic and immense victory, I continued working in the Front until August, 1975. Then I was sent to work on the International Arena, especially to participate in the ministerial conference of the non-aligned countries at the United Nations and in Lima. I did not work with the mass organisation, nor the organisation that was led by the revisionist.

Since then I worked with third countries and " non-aligned countries". While I was in the United Nations, I could see clearly the activities and manoeuvres of the United States and

the revisionist. These 2 nations welcomed the Cambodian delegation warmly and enthusiastically. I could see the United States was trying to contact the revisionist Soviet through Biyei Lorosy who was sitting west to the Cambodian delegation. I did not do anything against this but kept prudent, especially with the United States because they are more dangerous than the revisionist Soviet. The recent betrayal made me think about the danger of the revisionist to our revolution. I tried my best to develop relationships with the third world countries, especially with those who had supported us during the war. I tried to get away from the problems that those countries had and persuaded them to stage rebellions against the imperialist and revisionist. I encouraged them to strengthen friendships among third world countries and individually solve their own internal problems.

In 1976, at the United Nations conference on marine law, through my visits to the countries of Africa and in high profile conference of non-aligned countries in Colombo, I practiced the party line and strengthened friendships with those countries to isolate the enemy.

I noticed that Cuba and Papua New Guinea had not warmly or enthusiastically welcomed our delegation led by me. Their high ranking officials had not met our delegation. In Cuba they praised the Vietnamese very much.

2. Socialist Revolution in Cambodia

Before returning back to the country in late 1975, I did not notice that April 17, 1975 was the end of the People's Democratic Revolution. I did not realise that currency abolition and people evacuation had been practiced in terms of class struggle in order to continue the Socialist Revolution and to establish a socialist country. Then I realised that they were very important acts that needed to be done after the exhausting war. Besides, they were just the necessary measures. This thought of mine had come from the inaccurate internal information I had only read the book.

After having been re-educated, I understand and support the party's measures. The Socialist Revolution took place three times in the World history. The first one was in October 1917 in Russia led by Lenin. The second one was in October 1949 in China. the third and the last one was in April 17th, 1975 in Cambodia. The measures that the party used to continue the Socialist Revolution have never existed before. I believed that if it was not for this measure, Cambodia would have inevitably faced difficulty and may have lost independence, sovereignty and integrity. The sacrifice of one million Cambodian lives would have become useless. If not for this absolute measure the Vietnamese may come to oppress our country. With these measures, they still seize our land. Therefore, what would happen if the party did not use the measure?

Now the situation of the Socialist Revolution is very good and is better than in Vietnam and Laos. Within one year period, we can solve the problem of food shortage. This has never happened before. We succeeded in establishing the People's Democratic Revolution just after we had liberated our country and our people. Moreover, we have promoted and developed the Socialist Revolution. This is extraordinary. The abolition of currency in our country is a superb measure which has never existed in world history. I am very proud of these commitments and I am going to continue working based on the party line under the clear sighted leadership of the party. Besides the abolition of individual property in the

individual mind is the best way to dig up the roots of the revisionist in the party line. This movement has made me realise that I who used to be an oppressor is a subject of the Socialist Revolution. I must get rid of the personal property spirit. I gradually get rid of it and become more cheerful but I must continue getting rid of it.

The family property consciousness is still in existence, especially the sentiment with children but if compared with the past, it is much better. No matter what happens, I will never forget that the party have re-educated and trusted me. During the 1970 coup, the party called me to join the party again, I consider that the party has saved my life. With the trust and re-education I have received from the party, I took a role in the revolution until the victory and have worked to promote and develop the Socialist Revolution. I really do not know what would have happened to me if I had not met the party. I can not forget this beneficiary action and I will continue improving myself by getting rid of the personal property spirit. I will serve the revolution from the bottom of my heart and fill my life with good means.

This autobiography does not tell every step of my life but I am always pleased to tell everything if necessary.

December 25th, 1976